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I.   INTRODUCTION 
 In Bush v. Gore,1 the United States Supreme Court applied the 
Equal Protection Clause to the mechanics of state election admini-
stration. The Court invalidated the manual recount of the so-called 
undervote—that is, ballots that vote-counting machinery had found 
contained no indication of a vote for President—which the Florida 
Supreme Court had ordered to determine the winner of Florida’s vote 
for presidential electors in the 2000 presidential election.2 The 
United States Supreme Court reasoned that the principles it had 
previously articulated in applying the Equal Protection Clause to the 
vote were violated by the Florida court’s failure to assure consistency 
between and within Florida’s counties in the determination of 
whether particular undervote ballots constitute legally valid votes.3 
 The Court correctly determined that the Equal Protection Clause 
applies to the state and local procedures affecting the casting and 
                                                                                                                    
 * Vice Dean & Joseph P. Chamberlain Professor of Litigation, Columbia University 
School of Law. This paper benefited from the comments of the official commentators—
Steve Bickerstaff, Heather Gerken, and Spencer Overton—of an earlier draft presented at 
the Florida State University College of Law’s symposium on the Law of Presidential Elec-
tions: Issues in the Wake of Florida 2000, as well as from the thoughtful criticisms of Mike 
Dorf, Sam Issacharoff, and Rick Pildes.    
 1. 531 U.S. 98 (2000). 
 2. See Gore v. Harris, 772 So. 2d 1243 (Fla. 2000), rev’d sub nom. Bush v. Gore, 531 
U.S. 98 (2000). 
 3. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. at 104-07. 
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counting of ballots but was, for the most part, wrong to find that the 
Florida Supreme Court’s order denied Florida voters equal protec-
tion. In particular, the inconsistencies in counting undervotes, which 
the Florida court’s order appeared to tolerate and which so disturbed 
the United States Supreme Court, did not constitute an equal protec-
tion violation.  
 Equal protection ought to apply to the nitty-gritty of local election 
practices because those practices can have the effect of disenfranchis-
ing voters and discriminating among identifiable groups of voters. 
Such practices can negate the right to vote and the right to an 
equally weighted vote—rights long protected by the Equal Protection 
Clause. However, with virtually every local administrative decision 
having the potential to burden some voters relative to others, the ap-
plication of the Equal Protection Clause to election rules and proce-
dures could effectively federalize an area which has long been the 
domain of state and local government. Decentralization of election 
administration reflects important political values, including the op-
portunities for local participation and decisionmaking concerning 
contestable political issues, as well as protection from centralized po-
litical manipulation and abuse. Decentralization necessarily entails 
variation in election practices across the different local units charged 
with administering the procedures for casting and counting ballots. 
Subjecting all interlocal differences in election rules and procedures 
to close constitutional scrutiny could eliminate meaningful decen-
tralization of election administration.  
 This is not to say that decentralizing election administration to 
the local level is an inherently wise policy. State legislative or admin-
istrative measures addressed to the selection of voting machinery, 
ballot design, the process of obtaining absentee ballots, or the stan-
dards for conducting manual recounts could certainly improve our 
system of casting and counting votes. However, given the political 
values that support decentralization, I would suggest that the mix of 
state and local decisionmaking in election administration is primar-
ily a matter for political, not judicial determination. To be sure, judi-
cially imposed centralization would be appropriate when certain 
practices are necessarily required or precluded by constitutional 
principles. The presumption of universal adult citizen suffrage and 
the one person, one vote rule for weighting ballots are constitutional 
principles that ended alternative state or local rules concerning the 
availability of the franchise and the apportionment of legislative rep-
resentation. Comparable constitutional principles might prohibit cer-
tain state or local election administrative practices that consistently 
burden the vote or discriminate among voters. But not all questions 
concerning election administration can be resolved by reference to 
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constitutional principles, and not all state or local rules that affect 
the casting and counting of ballots violate constitutional norms. 
 The political tradition of decentralized election administration 
and the values that support it, combined with the absence of consti-
tutional rules for answering many questions of election procedure, 
suggest the need for an equal protection standard that both protects 
fundamental voting rights and respects local variations in rules and 
procedures. The Supreme Court apparently agrees.  Even as it ap-
plied equal protection to the details of election administration, Bush 
v. Gore underscored the need to constrain equal protection review 
when it “limited” its “consideration . . . to the present circumstances, 
for the problem of equal protection in election processes generally 
presents many complexities.”4 
 This Article will examine the equal protection issues presented in 
Bush v. Gore. Part II will review the political and legal struggle over 
counting and recounting the Florida presidential vote. Part III will 
summarize the equal protection analysis of the recount issues under-
taken by the Justices in Bush v. Gore. Part IV will then examine the 
Supreme Court’s treatment of the equal protection issues created by 
the Florida Supreme Court’s order in the context of a more general 
effort to determine an appropriate role for federal court equal protec-
tion review of state election procedures.  
 Drawing on a series of lower federal court cases decided prior to 
Bush v. Gore that dealt with constitutional challenges to local elec-
tion practices, I will suggest that federal constitutional intervention 
in state election administration should be limited to cases of “patent 
and fundamental unfairness”5 in which the state or local practice un-
dermines the integrity of the election itself. “[O]rdinary dispute[s] 
over the counting and marking of ballots,”6 even those involving ad-
ministrative errors that result in distinctions among voters, should 
not be treated as raising equal protection issues justifying federal 
court action. Applying that standard, the Florida Supreme Court’s 
manual recount order did not violate the Equal Protection Clause be-
cause it would not have caused fundamental unfairness in the Flor-
ida election. The Florida court’s manual recount order would not 
have led to the exclusion of any voters;7 it did not unconstitutionally 
                                                                                                                    
 4. Id. at 109. 
 5. Griffin v. Burns, 570 F.2d 1065, 1077 (1st Cir. 1978) (arguing that in cases of 
“patent and fundamental unfairness” due process may be violated). 
 6. Id.; see also Duncan v. Poythress, 657 F.2d 691, 704 (5th Cir. Unit B 1981) (stat-
ing that no constitutional question is presented by “garden variety challenges to the man-
ner in which ballots are counted”). 
 7. See Bennett v. Yoshina, 140 F.3d 1218, 1227 (9th Cir. 1998) (holding that election 
procedure will likely be held unconstitutional on substantive due process grounds only if 
“significant disenfranchisement” results from a change in election procedure). 
328  FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 29:325 
 
favor any group of voters over any other group of voters;8 and it did 
not unsettle any of the expectations, strategies, or voting plans of any 
of the participants in Florida’s electoral process.9 
 This is not to say that the Florida Supreme Court’s order was 
flawless. The Florida court violated equal protection principles by or-
dering the tabulation of recount results from some counties that may 
have included votes obtained from the manual recount of overvote 
ballots—that is, ballots that the vote-counting machinery rejected 
because they contained two or more presidential votes per voter—
without providing for a manual recount of overvote ballots elsewhere 
in the state. Although the Florida court could have constitutionally 
limited the recount to the undervote, it was a mistake to mingle 
votes retrieved from overvote ballots in some counties with a recount 
limited to undervote ballots in the other counties.  
 However, the Florida court’s failure to provide specific guidelines 
for the determination of what constituted a valid ballot—Bush v. 
Gore’s principal concern—was not unconstitutional. The lack of such 
guidance could have led to uncertainties in assessing ballots and 
might have resulted in variations among counties and canvassing 
teams in the standards for counting ballots. But variations in the 
definition of a valid undervote ballot in a manual recount would not 
have posed a threat to fundamental fairness. The manual recount 
would not have led to the exclusion of any ballots that were constitu-
tionally required to be counted. Nor would it have led to a departure 
from any generally accepted standard for determining which under-
vote ballots are valid votes. Bush v. Gore itself highlighted the mini-
mal constitutional protection accorded to undervote ballots when the 
Supreme Court effectively excluded all votes that might have been 
gleaned from a statewide inspection of the undervote ballots from 
Florida’s final tally. Presumably, the failure to count undervote bal-
lots was not a constitutional violation. 
 Moreover, the intercounty or intracounty variations in standards 
for determining whether an undervote ballot contained a legally 
valid vote were not ordered by state law and would not have reflected 
a state-level decision to prefer certain parts of the state or voters who 
                                                                                                                    
 8. Cf. Welch v. McKenzie, 765 F.2d 1311 (5th Cir. 1985) (rejecting challenge to elec-
tion based on claimed irregularities, errors, and fraud in the distribution of absentee bal-
lots given district court’s finding that, although numerous violations of state election laws 
had occurred, there was no evidence of racially discriminatory intent); Bell v. Southwell, 
376 F.2d 659 (5th Cir. 1967) (invalidating an election due to racially discriminatory prac-
tices in administration).  
 9. Cf. Partido Nuevo Progresista v. Barreto Perez, 639 F.2d 825, 828 (1st Cir. 1980) 
(upholding the counting of ballots containing marks outside the spaces and squares desig-
nated by law for marking preferences: “no party or person is likely to have acted to their 
detriment by relying upon the invalidity of ballots with marks outside the ballots’ drawn 
rectangles”). 
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backed particular candidates or voters associated with particular 
parties over others. Thus, any variations in counting standards 
would not have amounted to an unconstitutional discrimination 
among Florida voters. 
 To be sure, differences in standards for assessing undervote bal-
lots may be troubling. But the Florida Supreme Court’s apparent 
willingness to tolerate variations may have been required by the 
court’s need to abide by the special legal imperatives for resolving 
disputes concerning presidential elections articulated by the United 
States Supreme Court in Bush v. Palm Beach County Canvassing 
Board.10 In order to honor the state legislature’s constitutional pre-
rogative of writing the rules for the selection of presidential electors 
and the legislature’s presumptive interest in benefitting from the 
federal “safe harbor” law providing congressional deference to state 
resolutions of disputes concerning electors, the Florida court may 
have been unable to spell out more precise standards than those 
found in existing statutes and case law.  
 Rather than create a problem of fundamental unfairness, the Flor-
ida court’s order would have increased the fairness of the Florida 
vote. Unlike the county-level manual recounts conducted prior to the 
certification of the Florida results, the court-ordered statewide re-
count would not have been biased in favor of a particular candidate. 
Moreover, the manual recount would have provided a partial remedy 
for the intercounty disparities in the percentage of votes that re-
sulted in undervote ballots—disparities closely associated with the 
intercounty differences in the quality of Florida’s voting machinery. 
In short, instead of limiting voting rights and discriminating among 
voters, the Florida Supreme Court’s order promoted voting rights 
and the equal treatment of voters. Indeed, one striking consequence 
of the United States Supreme Court’s decision is that, unlike any 
other case in which the Equal Protection Clause was used to vindi-
cate the right to vote, Bush v. Gore produced a smaller electorate 
marked by greater intercounty discrepancies than would have been 
the case had the Court stayed its hand. 
 In Part V, I will conclude by touching on the relationship between 
the Court’s equal protection analysis and its commitment to federal-
ism. A central premise of our federal system is that many important 
questions are left to smaller units rather than bigger ones, even 
though—indeed, perhaps, because—that will create a multiplicity of 
different approaches. That is the philosophy of federalism which has 
been so central to the jurisprudence of the Justices who composed the 
Bush v. Gore majority and embraced the application of the Equal 
Protection Clause to the manual recount order. Bush v. Gore’s con-
                                                                                                                    
 10. 531 U.S. 70 (2000). 
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cern about interlocal variations in election administration suggests a 
surprising discomfort about the very values of local decisionmaking 
and interlocal variation which are at the heart of federalism itself.  
II.   COUNTING AND RECOUNTING THE FLORIDA BALLOTS IN THE 2000 
PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION 
 On November 7, 2000, the people of the United States went to the 
polls to vote for the next President and Vice President, or rather, as 
they were reminded over the next few days, to choose the electors 
who would vote for President and Vice President of the United 
States. On November 8, 2000, they awoke to find that although Vice 
President Al Gore enjoyed a narrow lead in the popular vote—his 
lead ultimately grew to 540,000 votes or about one-half of one per-
cent of the total vote cast—there was no electoral vote winner. With 
270 electoral votes necessary to win, Gore had carried states and the 
District of Columbia casting a total of 267 electoral votes.11 His Re-
publican opponent, Texas Governor George W. Bush, had carried 
states that would cast 246 electoral votes for him. Still in the bal-
ance, and with 25 electoral votes, the key to the election, was Florida. 
On the morning after the election, Bush led in Florida by 1,784 votes. 
Florida law required the ballot counting machines to count the bal-
lots again if the winner’s margin over the next-best candidate totaled 
less than one-half of one percent of the vote.12 Bush’s margin over 
Gore was about three-hundredths of one percent of the vote. The ma-
chine recount, which was completed by Friday, November 10, re-
duced Bush’s lead to a mere 327 votes,13 although his lead was likely 
to grow once the overseas absentee ballots, which historically had fa-
vored Republicans, were included. At no point after the machine re-
count did Bush’s margin over Gore ever exceed one thousand out of 
the nearly six million votes cast. 
 With the candidates so close, the legal issues over the next five 
weeks were dominated by Gore’s efforts to obtain a recount.14 For-
                                                                                                                    
 11. Ultimately, Vice President Gore received just 266 electoral votes when one Dis-
trict of Columbia elector who was pledged to Gore spoiled her ballot. 
 12. FLA. STAT. § 102.141(4) (2000), amended by 2001 Fla. Laws ch. 40, § 41, at 148-49. 
 13. THE NEW YORK TIMES, 36 DAYS: THE COMPLETE CHRONICLE OF THE 2000 
PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION CRISIS 29 (2001) [hereinafter 36 DAYS]. 
 14. Recount-related issues were not the only legal questions growing out of the Flor-
ida presidential vote that state and federal courts addressed in November and December 
2000. Voters in Palm Beach County unsuccessfully challenged that county’s unusual and 
apparently confusing “butterfly ballot,” which, they contended, caused many Gore voters to 
mistakenly vote for Pat Buchanan. Fladell v. Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd., 772 So. 
2d 1240 (Fla. 2000). The actions of election officials in Seminole and Martin Counties, 
which enabled Republican party workers to add voter identification numbers to requests 
for absentee ballots, led to challenges to the legality of absentee ballots in those counties. 
Jacobs v. Seminole County Canvassing Bd., 773 So. 2d 519 (Fla. 2000); Taylor v. Martin 
County Canvassing Bd., 773 So. 2d 517 (Fla. 2000). Absentee ballot issues may ultimately 
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mally, this challenge consisted first of a protest phase—that is, chal-
lenges to county-level election results—prior to the formal certifica-
tion of the statewide results; and, then, a contest phase, or a chal-
lenge to the certified statewide result. The recount struggle can also 
be analyzed in terms of the different legal issues that dominated its 
different stages. Initially, these concerned primarily questions of tim-
ing, authority, and discretion. Could Florida’s Secretary of State 
waive the statutory deadline for the submission of county-level elec-
tion results and include late-filed results from county canvassing 
boards that had undertaken manual recounts? Was she required to 
do so? Did the statutory authorization to undertake a manual re-
count on evidence of an “error in the vote tabulation” apply to in-
stances where the vote-counting machinery had worked as designed 
but had failed to count imperfectly marked ballots? Did the Florida 
courts have the authority to require the Secretary of State to accept 
late-filed returns?  
 In early December, the legal issues began to shift from the powers 
and duties of boards and courts to the equal treatment of voters in 
different counties, the standards for determining whether an imper-
fectly marked ballot is a legal vote, and the interplay of these two 
questions. These were the issues that either shaped or came directly 
before the Supreme Court in Bush v. Gore. However, the earlier is-
sues played an important role in the development of the recount 
struggle and also helped frame the equal protection questions that 
took center stage in Bush v. Gore. 
A.   The Protest Phase 
 Like most states, Florida uses a highly decentralized procedure 
for conducting elections, counting votes, and challenging vote 
counts.15 Elections are conducted by county supervisors of elections, 
and the votes are counted by county canvassing boards composed of 
each county’s supervisor of elections, a county court judge, and the 
chair of the board of county commissioners.16 The county canvassing 
board certifies the results and, for elections involving state or federal 
offices, transmits them to the state. The state Elections Canvassing 
Commission, composed of the Governor, the Secretary of State, and 
the Director of the Division of Elections, certifies the returns and de-
                                                                                                                    
have been crucial in resolving the presidential election. David Barstow & Don Van Natta, 
Jr., How Bush Took Florida: Mining the Overseas Absentee Vote, N.Y. TIMES, July 15, 2001, 
at A1. 
 15. Florida’s election laws are codified at FLA. STAT. chs. 101-02 (2000). After the 
2000 presidential election, the Florida Legislature made significant amendments to the 
election code. See 2001 Fla. Laws ch. 40. This Article considers the election statutes as they 
existed before the 2001 amendments.  
 16. FLA. STAT. §§ 102.131(1), 102.141(2) (2000) (amended 2001). 
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clares the winner based on the county results.17 This process is re-
quired by law to be concluded within seven days after the election, or, 
in 2000, by 5 p.m. on Tuesday, November 14—with the exception of 
overseas absentee ballots which, as a result of a consent decree, may 
be received until ten days after the election.18 
 Florida law also provides that protests of election returns may be 
submitted to the county canvassing boards.19 Any candidate or voter 
can protest the returns of an election as erroneous,20 any candidate or 
political party whose candidates’ names appeared on the ballot may 
ask a county board for a manual recount, and the county board is au-
thorized to undertake a manual recount.21 If a manual check of at 
least three precincts involving one percent of the total votes cast in 
the county “indicates an error in the vote tabulation which could af-
fect the outcome of the election,” the county canvassing board is au-
thorized, but not required, to “manually recount all ballots.”22 To do 
so, the county canvassing board appoints counting teams composed of 
voters who are members of at least two political parties, who then in-
spect the ballots by hand.23 “If a counting team is unable to deter-
mine a voter’s intent in casting a ballot, the ballot shall be presented 
to the county canvassing board for it to determine the voter’s in-
tent.”24 
 Between November 9 and November 11, the Democratic Party 
filed protests and requested manual recounts in Broward, Miami-
Dade, Palm Beach, and Volusia Counties. Broward, Miami-Dade, and 
Palm Beach are the three most populous counties in the state. Gore 
carried Broward and Palm Beach by substantial margins.25 Gore led 
by much smaller margins in Miami-Dade, the state’s most populous 
county, and in Volusia, a much smaller county. 
 In Broward, Miami-Dade, and Palm Beach Counties, the machine 
counts found a significant number of presidential ballots that con-
tained no presidential preference—nearly 30,000 such ballots in Mi-
ami-Dade and Broward each, and another 15,000 in Palm Beach.26 In 
                                                                                                                    
 17. Id. § 102.111(1). 
 18. See id. 
 19. Id. § 102.166. 
 20. Id. § 102.166(1). 
 21. Id. § 102.166(4)(a), (c). The request for a manual recount must be filed prior to the 
time the county canvassing board certifies the result for the office in question, or within 
seventy-two hours of election day, whichever is later. Id. § 102.166(4)(b). 
 22. Id. § 102.166(5). 
 23. Id. § 102.166(7)(a). 
 24. Id. § 102.166(7)(b). 
 25. 36 DAYS, supra note 13, at 285. Gore received his highest county percentage in 
Broward, and his third highest percentage of the county vote in Palm Beach. Gore’s num-
ber two county, Gadsden, cast well under 20,000 votes, compared with the nearly one mil-
lion votes cast in Broward and Palm Beach together. 
 26. Id. 
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terminology that became famous as the recount struggle continued, 
these no-preference ballots consisted of undervotes—ballots which, 
according to the vote-counting machinery, contained no vote for any 
presidential candidate—and overvotes—ballots in which the voter 
voted for more than one candidate and thus invalidated the ballot. 
The undervote ballots became the principal focus of the political and 
legal battle over the recount. Although some undervote ballots may 
have reflected the decision of voters to skip the presidential election 
and focus on other races, Gore’s forces alleged that in many cases 
voters had attempted to cast a presidential vote, but due to problems 
with the voting machinery, their preferences had failed to register.27  
 Indeed, the percentage of a county’s ballots containing undervotes 
was associated with the type of voting machinery the county used, 
suggesting that problems with the voting machinery were at least as 
important a factor as voter preferences in explaining why some bal-
lots that bore voters’ markings had not been read by the machines as 
containing votes.28 Broward, Miami-Dade and Palm Beach Counties 
were among the two dozen Florida counties that used Votomatic 
punch card ballots.29 In those counties, a voter casts a ballot by plac-
ing a punch card into a holder and then uses a stylus to make a hole 
in the ballot card corresponding to the voter’s preference. A machine 
“reads” the light coming through the hole in the ballot card and re-
cords it as a vote. A ballot can be counted by the machine only if the 
hole is punched through cleanly, and the “chad”—or the material oc-
cupying the space to be punched out to make the hole—is cleanly de-
tached. Counties using Votomatic punch card ballots had five times 
the undervote rate as counties using optical scan ballots, in which 
voters mark their choice with a pencil next to the name of their pre-
ferred candidate.30 The high undervote rate was apparently attribut-
able to problems characteristic of the punch card mechanism. If the 
punch card and the cardholder are improperly aligned, the punch 
tool may fail to punch out the hole fully. The rubber or plastic strips 
that help hold the card in place may age and become too stiff to allow 
the paper to be punched out of the hole, that is, the strips prevent the 
chad from passing through, creating a dented or “dimpled” chad but 
not a detached one. When these problems occur, the voter’s attempt 
to vote may leave a mark on the ballot which is not read by the vote-
counting machinery but is detectable as a vote to a human vote-
counter. 
                                                                                                                    
 27. Compl. to Contest Election at 7-8, Gore v. Harris, No. CIV-00-2808 (Fla. 2d Cir. 
Ct. Nov. 27, 2000), available at http://election2000.stanford.edu/CV-00-2808a.pdf. 
 28. 36 DAYS, supra note 13, at 189-91. 
 29. Id.  
 30. Id.  
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 The combination of large voting populations, large margins for 
Gore, and high undervote rates due to the use of Votomatic punch 
card ballots made Broward and Palm Beach Counties particularly at-
tractive targets for Democratic efforts to obtain a manual recount. 
Although Gore’s margin in Miami-Dade was smaller, the county’s 
large population and high undervote rate indicated that it, too, might 
provide Gore with an appreciable net gain relative to Bush. The 
fourth county in which a manual recount was sought, Volusia, dif-
fered from the others. Volusia used optical scan equipment and, thus, 
had only a small undervote. But the Volusia count had been marked 
by a malfunction of the electronic ballot tabulating machine in one 
precinct, making a manual recount appropriate.31 
 Initially, only the Palm Beach and Volusia county canvassing 
boards voted to undertake manual recounts. Palm Beach County un-
dertook the one percent sample recount and found sufficient new 
votes to constitute “an error in the vote tabulation which could affect 
the outcome of the election.”32 Broward and Miami-Dade undertook 
the sample recounts but decided that countywide manual recounts 
were not warranted.33 Nor was it clear whether any of the manual re-
count findings would be included in the certified results. On Novem-
ber 13, Florida Secretary of State Katherine Harris announced that 
she would adhere to the November 14 statutory deadline for certify-
ing the election results—excluding the overseas absentee ballots—
even if manual recounts were still pending. She contended that in 
the absence of an Act of God, such as a hurricane, she had no author-
ity to count any returns received after the November 14 deadline.34 
 On November 14, Judge Terry Lewis of Florida’s Second Circuit 
Court in Tallahassee found that Secretary Harris had the discretion 
to include late-filed manual recount returns in the statewide results, 
notwithstanding the statutory deadline to certify the election.35 In-
deed, Judge Lewis suggested that such authority to waive the dead-
line was actually necessary to prevent discrimination against the 
most populous counties.36 Secretary Harris’ refusal to accept manu-
ally recounted returns submitted in good faith after the seven-day 
deadline  
would mean . . . that only in sparsely populated counties could a 
Canvassing Board safely exercise what the Legislature has clearly 
                                                                                                                    
 31. See Siegel v. LePore, 120 F. Supp. 2d 1041, 1046 (S.D. Fla. 2000), aff’d, 234 F.3d 
1163 (11th Cir. 2000). 
 32. FLA. STAT. § 102.166(5) (2000) (amended 2001). 
 33. 36 DAYS, supra note 13, at 65 (Broward), 72 (Miami-Dade). 
 34. McDermott v. Harris, 2000 WL 1693713, at *1 (Fla. 2d Cir. Ct. Nov. 14, 2000). 
 35. Id. 
 36. Id. at *2. 
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intended to be an option where the Board has a real question as to 
the accuracy of a vote. 
 . . . It is unlikely that the Legislature would give the right to pro-
test returns, but make it meaningless because it could not be acted 
upon in time.37 
 In response to Judge Lewis’ ruling, Secretary Harris invited the 
Broward, Miami-Dade, and Palm Beach canvassing boards—
Volusia’s had completed its recount by the statutory deadline—to 
submit statements of “facts and circumstances” that would justify 
her acceptance of late-filed amended returns. After the boards filed 
their statements, she rejected their reasons, concluding that only 
proof of voter fraud, substantial noncompliance with statutory elec-
tion procedures, an Act of God, or similar “extenuating circum-
stances” such as “an electrical power outage, a malfunction of the 
transmitting equipment, or a mechanical malfunction of the voting 
tabulation system”—none of which had been alleged by the coun-
ties—justified waiver of the statutory deadline.38 On November 17, 
Judge Lewis sustained the Secretary’s action as an acceptable exer-
cise of her discretion.39 The Florida Supreme Court, however, agreed 
to take the case and enjoined the Secretary and the state Elections 
Canvassing Commission from certifying the results of the presiden-
tial election pending the court’s decision on the merits. Following the 
state supreme court’s order, the Miami-Dade canvassing board voted 
to join Broward and Palm Beach Counties in conducting a full man-
ual recount. As the court prepared for a full hearing, the counties 
canvassed the overseas absentee ballots, with final but unofficial fig-
ures boosting Bush’s lead to 930 votes. 
 On November 21, a unanimous Florida Supreme Court reversed 
Judge Lewis and found that Secretary Harris was required to accept 
late-filed returns. In Palm Beach County Canvassing Board v. Har-
ris, the court rejected the Secretary’s argument that the statutory 
standard of “error in the vote tabulation” referred only to machine 
failures to include machine-readable results.40 The court, thus, con-
firmed that the manual recount was authorized by statute when the 
sample recounts detected a discrepancy between the machine totals 
and the sample manual recount results.41 Emphasizing the funda-
mental importance of the right to vote under the Florida Constitu-
tion,42 the court held that the Secretary could ignore the late-filed re-
                                                                                                                    
 37. Id. 
 38. Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd. v. Harris, 772 So. 2d 1220, 1226-27 n.5 (Fla. 
2000), vacated sub nom. Bush v. Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd., 531 U.S. 70 (2000). 
 39. McDermott v. Harris, 2000 WL 1714590, at *1 (Fla. 2d Cir. Ct. Nov. 17, 2000).  
 40. 772 So. 2d at 1229-30. 
 41. Id. 
 42. Id. at 1236-37. 
336  FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 29:325 
 
sults of a county manual recount only when the results are submitted 
“so late that their inclusion will compromise the integrity of the elec-
toral process” by precluding the ability of either a candidate or voter 
to contest the certification of the election results or preventing the 
State of Florida from completing its count in time to participate fully 
in the presidential election.43 The court required the Secretary to ac-
cept all amended county canvassing board certifications filed by 5 
p.m. on Sunday, November 26.44 
 In the five days between the Florida Supreme Court’s order and 
the deadline it imposed, Broward County completed its recount. The 
Miami-Dade County canvassing board began a recount focused on 
the approximately 10,000 ballots that contained no presidential 
preference; then reversed itself and ordered a recount of all of the 
county’s nearly 700,000 ballots; then reversed itself again and, be-
sieged by an intense and intermittently violent crowd of Republican 
demonstrators, voted that since it could not complete the full recount 
within the time allotted by the Florida Supreme Court it would not 
undertake a recount at all.45 The Florida Supreme Court unani-
mously refused a request by the Gore campaign to compel Miami-
Dade to resume the recount.46 
 Palm Beach County undertook its recount but found itself running 
out of time as the evening of November 26 approached. Palm Beach 
County requested an extension until 9 a.m. on November 27—a time 
that the Florida Supreme Court had indicated was also acceptable.47 
Secretary Harris rejected the request. Ultimately, Palm Beach com-
pleted its recount a little after 7 p.m. on the night of November 26, 
but Secretary Harris refused to include the returns in the certified 
results.48 With only the Broward County recount results included, 
George W. Bush, with his lead reduced to 537 votes, was certified as 
the winner. 
 Following the Florida Supreme Court’s order to the Secretary to 
accept late-filed county results but before the expiration of the court’s 
deadline for completion of the recounts, Bush sought United States 
                                                                                                                    
 43. Id. at 1237. 
 44. Id. at 1240.  
 45. See 36 DAYS, supra note 13, at 133-35. 
 46. Id. at 142. 
 47. The court specified 5 p.m., Sunday, November 26, as the deadline for the county 
canvassing boards’ submissions of manual recount results “provided that the office of the 
Secretary of State, Division of Elections is open in order to allow receipt thereof. If the of-
fice is not open for this special purpose on Sunday, November 26, 2000, then any amended 
certifications shall be accepted until 9 a.m. on Monday, November 27, 2000.” Palm Beach 
County Canvassing Bd. v. Harris, 772 So. 2d at 1240. Plainly, the Secretary’s acceptance of 
Palm Beach County’s recount results on the morning of Monday, November 27 would have 
been consistent with both the spirit and the letter of the Florida Supreme Court’s order.  
 48. 36 DAYS, supra note 13, at 164-66, 171-72. 
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Supreme Court review of the Florida court’s decision. On November 
24, while the recounts were underway, the Supreme Court granted 
certiorari with respect to two of the questions Bush raised49—
whether the Florida court’s order was inconsistent (1) with Article II, 
Section 1, Clause 2 of the United States Constitution, which provides 
that presidential electors shall be appointed by each state “in such 
Manner as the Legislature thereof may direct;” or (2) with 3 U.S.C. § 
5, which requires Congress to accept a state’s resolution of a dispute 
concerning the selection of presidential electors provided, inter alia, 
that the state’s resolution is pursuant to “laws enacted prior to” elec-
tion day and is completed not later than six days before the day set 
for the Electoral College to vote.50  
 On December 4, the United States Supreme Court in Bush v. 
Palm Beach County Canvassing Board,51 vacated the Florida Su-
preme Court’s order. The United States Supreme Court expressed 
concern that the Florida court’s reliance on the state constitution’s 
protection of the right to vote in interpreting the state legislative 
scheme for election protests was in tension with the federal constitu-
tional provision giving the state legislature exclusive power to direct 
the appointment of presidential electors.52 The Court also noted the 
relevance of 3 U.S.C. § 5, observing that “a legislative wish to take 
advantage of the ‘safe harbor’ would counsel against any construction 
of the [Florida] Election Code that Congress might deem to be a 
change in the law.”53 Consequently, the United States Supreme 
Court vacated the Florida Supreme Court’s action and remanded the 
case to the Florida court to clarify whether it had been appropriately 
mindful of Article II, Section 1 and 3 U.S.C. § 5 in its analysis of the 
Florida Election Code. On remand, the Florida Supreme Court reit-
erated its earlier decision, taking care this time to ground its reason-
ing solely on the text of the relevant Florida statutes and its “percep-
tion of legislative intent.”54 
B.   The Contest Phase 
 With Bush certified as the statewide winner, Gore moved under 
Florida law to contest the certification. Unlike his earlier protests of 
                                                                                                                    
 49. Bush v. Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd., 531 U.S. 1004 (2000).    
 50. 3 U.S.C. § 5 (1994). 
 51. 531 U.S. 70 (2000). 
 52. Id. at 76-77. 
 53. Id. at 78. 
 54. Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd. v. Harris, 772 So. 2d 1273, 1291 (Fla. 2000). 
The initial Palm Beach decision had been unanimous. The remand was on a 6-1 vote, with 
Chief Justice Wells dissenting solely based on his opposition to “issuing a new decision 
while the United States Supreme Court has under consideration Bush v. Gore . . . .” Id. at 
1292. Bush v. Gore had been argued prior to the Florida Supreme Court’s decision on re-
mand; the United States Supreme Court’s decision was issued the next day. 
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the Broward, Miami-Dade, Palm Beach and Volusia returns, which 
involved requests of individual county canvassing boards to recheck 
the tabulations within their counties, the contest was a judicial pro-
ceeding, brought in circuit court, to challenge the result of the entire 
election. The statutory grounds on which Gore relied, however, were 
similar to the grounds for his protests—“[r]eceipt of a number of ille-
gal votes or rejection of a number of legal votes sufficient to change 
or place in doubt the result of the election.”55 Gore alleged five in-
stances of the rejection of legal votes or the inclusion of illegal votes 
which were sufficient to “change or place in doubt the election”:  
(1) Secretary Harris’ failure to include the results of the Palm 
Beach County recount, completed just hours after the November 
26 deadline; 
(2) An additional 3,300 undercount ballots which the Palm Beach 
County canvassing board had examined but declined to treat as le-
gal votes; 
(3) The results of the partial manual recount undertaken in Mi-
ami-Dade County before the Miami-Dade canvassing board had 
voted to abandon the recount; 
(4) An additional nine to ten thousand Miami ballots which the 
Miami-Dade County canvassing board had set aside as undervote 
ballots but had never reviewed; and 
(5) Votes identified in the machine recount of Nassau County’s 
votes that were not included in the certified Nassau result. With 
respect to Nassau, the statutory machine recount had reduced the 
county total by 218 votes and clipped Bush’s lead by 51 votes. Al-
though Nassau County originally certified the machine recount 
figures as the official result, the county canvassing board subse-
quently voted to rescind the certification and, instead, certified the 
election-night count, thereby adding to Bush’s lead. Even though 
this had occurred after November 14, Secretary Harris accepted 
the results and included them in Bush’s 537-vote margin of vic-
tory.56 
 Following a two-day trial, Judge N. Sanders Sauls of Florida’s 
Second Circuit ruled on December 3, 2000, that, as a matter of law, 
in order to prevail in an election contest the challenger must demon-
strate a “reasonable probability” that the ballots in question would 
change the statewide result.57 The court determined that Gore had 
failed to meet the reasonable probability standard. As a result, Gore 
                                                                                                                    
 55. FLA. STAT. § 102.168(3)(c) (2000). 
 56. See generally Gore v. Harris, 772 So. 2d 1243, 1247-48 (Fla. 2000), rev’d sub nom. 
Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000); Compl. to Contest Election at 3-4, Gore v. Harris, No. 
CIV-00-2808 (Fla. 2d Cir. Ct. Nov. 27, 2000), available at http://election2000.stanford.edu/ 
CV-00-2808a.pdf; 36 DAYS, supra note 13, at 173-74. 
 57. Gore v. Harris, 2000 WL 1770257 (Fla. 2d Cir. Ct. Dec. 4, 2000), rev’d, Gore v. 
Harris, 772 So. 2d 1243 (Fla. 2000), rev’d sub nom. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000).  
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could not obtain review of the ballots which he claimed would give 
him enough votes to prevail. The court also determined that the spe-
cific decisions of the Miami-Dade, Nassau, and Palm Beach canvass-
ing boards with respect to the inclusion or exclusion of ballots must 
be sustained unless they constituted an abuse of discretion. The 
court found that no such abuse of discretion was shown. 
 Gore appealed to the Florida Supreme Court, and on December 8 
a divided court ruled in his favor. In Gore v. Harris,58 six of the seven 
Florida Supreme Court justices ruled that the circuit court had ap-
plied erroneous legal standards. They determined that the “abuse of 
discretion” standard was far too deferential to the county canvassing 
boards’ decisions,59 and they found that, due to amendments to the 
Election Code enacted in 1999, an election contest plaintiff need 
prove only a reasonable possibility, not probability, of success in or-
der to compel the counting of uncounted ballots.60 A four-justice ma-
jority then found that an “undisputed showing of the existence of 
some 9000 ‘undervotes’ [in Miami-Dade County] in an election con-
test decided by a margin measured in the hundreds [provided] a 
threshold showing that the result of an election has been placed in 
doubt, warranting a manual count . . . .”61 The Florida Supreme 
Court, however, went well beyond Gore’s request for relief and held 
that, given the statewide nature of the presidential election, “it is ab-
solutely essential in this proceeding and to any final decision, that a 
manual recount be conducted for all legal votes in this State . . . in all 
Florida counties where there was an undervote and, hence, a concern 
that not every citizen’s vote was counted.”62  
 The focus of the contest litigation in Miami-Dade and Palm 
Beach—and of the earlier protest litigation in those two counties and 
Broward County—was largely the result of decisions of the Gore 
campaign to target their efforts on the counties where a recount was 
likely to generate the most Democratic votes. But, the court rea-
soned, the “election should be determined by a careful examination of 
the votes of Florida’s citizens and not by strategies extraneous to the 
voting process.”63 The court, thus, required a statewide recount of the 
undervote.64 The court remanded the case to the circuit court with di-
                                                                                                                    
 58. 772 So. 2d 1243 (Fla. 2000), rev’d sub nom. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000). 
 59. Id. at 1252 (per curiam), 1271 (Harding, J., dissenting). 
 60. Id. at 1256 (per curiam), 1271 (Harding, J., dissenting). 
 61. Id. at 1256. Two of the Florida Supreme Court dissenters agreed with the major-
ity in rejecting the abuse of discretion and reasonable probability of success standards. See 
id. 1270-71 (Harding, J., dissenting). 
 62. Id. at 1253. 
 63. Id. 
 64. Id. Justices Harding and Shaw agreed with the majority concerning the legal 
standards for a contest but determined that Gore had failed to show “by a preponderance 
of the evidence, that the outcome of the statewide election would likely be changed” by the 
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rections to order the county supervisors of elections and county can-
vassing boards to conduct a manual recount of the undervotes in all 
counties that had not previously done so.65 
 The Florida Supreme Court only briefly addressed a question that 
had beset the canvassing boards of the three counties that had un-
dertaken manual recounts—“what, under Florida law, may consti-
tute a ‘legal vote?’”66 Florida law defined a ballot to be validly cast if 
the intent of the voter could be discerned. The recounts that the 
county canvassing boards had conducted during the protest phase 
were marked by sometimes heated debates over what constituted 
sufficient evidence of intent to vote for a candidate: Did a ballot have 
to have some of its chad detached? Was piercing of the chad, so that 
light could penetrate, sufficient? Was piercing even necessary, or 
would an indentation or dimpling of the chad next to a candidate’s 
name be sufficient to indicate intent to cast a vote? Even the dim-
pled-chad standard was not entirely straightforward, with some ob-
servers arguing that dimpled chads could evidence intent only if all 
the different offices listed on the ballot were marked by dimpled 
chads. Others contended that a dimpled presidential chad even with-
out a pattern of dimpled voting was enough.67  
 Perhaps mindful of the United States Supreme Court’s warning in 
Bush v. Palm Beach County Canvassing Board against encroaching 
on the legislature’s federal constitutional prerogative to set the rules 
for the selection of presidential electors or threatening the federal 
statutory safe harbor by judicial creation of a postelection law con-
cerning the review of undervote ballots, the Florida court stuck 
closely to Florida’s statutes and case law, which had defined a “legal 
vote” as one in which there is a “clear indication of the intent of the 
voter.”68 The court did reject Gore’s claim concerning the 3,300 bal-
lots examined during the Palm Beach County recount but not in-
cluded in the county vote total. Gore contended that Palm Beach 
County’s failure to apply the most expansive application of the in-
                                                                                                                    
relief he had sought. Id. at 1272 (Harding, J., dissenting). Justices Harding and Shaw 
agreed with the majority that any recount would have to be statewide, but the dissenters 
found that Gore had failed to show that it was reasonably likely he would prevail on a 
statewide recount. Id. Moreover, they disagreed with the majority’s decision to limit the re-
count to the undervote, indicating that all no-vote ballots—overvotes as well as under-
votes—would have to be manually counted. Id. at 1272-73. They expressed doubt that this 
could be accomplished by the federal “safe harbor” date of December 12. Id.  
 Only Chief Justice Wells agreed with the circuit court that an abuse of discretion stan-
dard applied. He also determined that a fair and accurate statewide recount could not be 
conducted in the limited time available, and he called for the conclusion of the ballot count-
ing process. Id. at 1266-70 (Wells, C.J., dissenting). 
 65. Id. at 1262. 
 66. Id. at 1256. 
 67. See, e.g., 36 DAYS, supra note 13, at 130, 145-46, 152-53, 159. 
 68. Gore v. Harris, 772 So. 2d at 1257. 
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tent-of-the-voter standard—which would have treated a dimpled 
presidential chad as a vote without regard to whether other prefer-
ences on the ballot were also marked by dimpled chads—was a legal 
error. The Florida Supreme Court’s rejection of Gore’s Palm Beach 
claim, however, was not a decision on the merits concerning how to 
apply the intent of the voter standard but simply a finding that Gore 
had “failed to introduce any evidence to refute the Canvassing 
Board’s determination that the 3300 ballots did not constitute ‘legal 
votes.’”69  
 Completing its disposition of Gore’s specific contest claims, the 
Florida Supreme Court ruled against Gore with respect to the Nas-
sau County vote when it affirmed the circuit court’s decision uphold-
ing Nassau County’s use of the original machine count—rather than 
the machine recount—in determining that county’s vote.70 The court, 
however, also ruled that the Palm Beach County manual recount—
which the county canvassing board had completed but which Secre-
tary Harris had refused to include in her certified count—and the 
additional votes that had resulted from the partial recount conducted 
by the Miami-Dade County Canvassing Board had to be immediately 
included in the statewide total.71 This cut Bush’s lead to less than 
200 votes.72 
 The effect of the Florida Supreme Court’s order was short-lived. 
The following day the United States Supreme Court stayed the Flor-
ida court’s mandate.73 Three days later, the United States Supreme 
Court reversed, holding that various aspects of the Florida court’s 
order violated the Equal Protection Clause.74 
III.   BUSH V. GORE: THE OPINIONS 
 Bush had raised an equal protection argument in his petition for 
writ of certiorari challenging the Florida Supreme Court’s Palm 
Beach County Canvassing Board v. Harris decision, but the United 
States Supreme Court had focused only on the Article II and 3 U.S.C. 
§ 5 questions and declined to grant certiorari on the equal protection 
question.75 Bush had also raised equal protection arguments in sepa-
rate efforts to bar county-level recounts prior to the Gore v. Harris 
                                                                                                                    
 69. Id. at 1260. 
 70. Id.  
 71. Id.  
 72. There was some dispute as to the size of Gore’s net gain in Palm Beach County. 
Depending on the count, Bush’s lead after the Florida Supreme Court decision was either 
154 or 193. 
 73. See Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 1046 (2000).  
 74. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000).    
 75. See Bush v. Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd., 531 U.S. 1004 (2000). 
342  FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 29:325 
 
contest order, but two Florida federal district courts and the en banc 
Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals had rejected his arguments.76 
 Equal protection, however, dominated the Supreme Court’s review 
of the Florida Supreme Court’s manual recount order.77 All nine Jus-
tices discussed the equal protection question, with six Justices, and 
possibly seven, finding an equal protection violation. The Court’s re-
liance on equal protection has potentially enormous significance. Ar-
ticle II, Section 1 and 3 U.S.C. § 5 apply only to presidential elec-
tions. Equal protection principles, however, apply to all elections—
federal, state, and local. Although the Court self-consciously “limited” 
its “consideration” “to the present circumstances,”78 Bush v. Gore 
broke new ground in applying equal protection to state and local 
election administration and procedure. The case could subject a wide 
range of state and local election practices to federal constitutional re-
view. 
A.   The Per Curiam Opinion 
 The Bush v. Gore per curiam opinion, joined by Chief Justice 
Rehnquist and Justices O’Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas, 
found four equal protection problems in the Gore v. Harris order. 
First, and most importantly, the Florida Supreme Court permitted 
inconsistent treatment, both among counties and, apparently, among 
counting teams within counties, in the determination of which ballots 
would count as legal votes.79 The per curiam reasoned that by not 
providing more detailed guidance than the “intent of the voter” stan-
dard, the Florida court’s manual recount order would lead to the dif-
ferential treatment of similarly marked ballots in different counties. 
Indeed, by accepting recount totals from counties that had already 
conducted their recounts using apparently differing standards, the 
Florida court had “ratified this uneven treatment.”80 Second, the 
Florida court’s order also accepted recount results from some coun-
ties that had not limited their recounts to undervotes but had also 
apparently included overvotes.81 As a result, valid votes found on 
overvote ballots in those counties would be included in the final tally, 
but comparably valid votes found on overvote ballots cast elsewhere 
in the state would not be. Third, Gore v. Harris had certified a partial 
                                                                                                                    
 76. See Siegel v. LePore, 120 F. Supp. 2d 1041 (S.D. Fla. 2000), aff’d, 234 F.3d 1163 
(11th Cir. 2000) (en banc); Touchston v. McDermott, 120 F. Supp. 2d 1055 (M.D. Fla. 
2000), aff’d, 234 F.3d 1133 (11th Cir. 2000) (en banc). 
 77. See Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000), rev’g Gore v. Harris, 772 So. 2d 1243 (Fla. 
2000). 
 78. Id. at 109.  
 79. See id. at 107.  
 80. Id.  
 81. Id. 
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manual recount result from Miami-Dade County. “The Florida Su-
preme Court’s decision thus gives no assurance that the recounts in-
cluded in the final certification must be complete.”82 In other words, 
some ballots might be accepted and included in the final tabulation, 
but other comparable ballots might not be counted and thus not in-
cluded in the final result. Although the failure to complete the re-
count would be due to a lack of time rather than a desire to exclude 
any voters, “[t]he press of time does not diminish the constitutional 
concern. A desire for speed is not a general excuse for ignoring equal 
protection guarantees.”83 Finally, the Court criticized “the actual 
process” in which the manual recount would be undertaken.84 The 
order in Gore v. Harris  
did not specify who would recount the ballots. The county canvass-
ing boards were forced to pull together ad hoc teams [comprised] of 
judges from various Circuits who had no previous training in han-
dling and interpreting ballots. Furthermore, while others were 
permitted to observe, they were prohibited from objecting during 
the recount.85  
Although these concerns sound more in due process than in equal 
protection, the per curiam did not refer to the Due Process Clause 
and voiced these process concerns in the framework of its equal pro-
tection discussion. Presumably, the lack of a proper process would 
make discrepancies in recount standards more likely to occur and 
less likely to be corrected. 
B.   Justice Souter 
 Justice Souter’s very brief treatment of the equal protection issue 
focused exclusively on the question that was the primary focus of the 
per curiam—the use of different standards in the determination of 
whether a ballot ought to be counted.86  
It is true that the Equal Protection Clause does not forbid the use 
of a variety of voting mechanisms within a jurisdiction, even 
though different mechanisms will have different levels of effective-
ness in recording voters’ intentions; local variety can be justified 
by concerns about cost, the potential value of innovation, and so 
on. But evidence in the record here suggests that a different order 
of disparity obtains under rules for determining a voter’s intent 
that have been applied (and could continue to be applied) to identi-
cal types of ballots used in identical brands of machines and exhib-
iting identical physical characteristics. . . . I can conceive of no le-
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 84. Id. at 109.  
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 86. Id. at 134 (Souter, J., dissenting).  
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gitimate state interest served by these differing treatments of the 
expressions of voters’ fundamental rights. The differences appear 
wholly arbitrary.87 
Justice Souter’s opinion did not address whether the inclusion of 
some overvotes, the certification of incomplete returns, or the Florida 
Supreme Court’s recount process presented constitutional concerns.  
C.   Justice Breyer 
 Although counted by commentators as one of seven Justices who 
found the Gore v. Harris order violated the Equal Protection Clause, 
Justice Breyer’s position was far more equivocal. On the one hand, 
Justice Breyer joined Justice Souter’s opinion, including the portion 
of Justice Souter’s opinion that found Bush’s equal protection argu-
ment “meritorious.”88 On the other hand, Justice Breyer also joined 
Justice Stevens’ dissenting opinion, in which Justice Stevens rejected 
the claim that the Florida Supreme Court’s manual recount order 
violated equal protection principles.89  
 In his own separate opinion, Justice Breyer observed that the in-
consistencies in counting undervote ballots “implicate principles of 
fundamental fairness,” and that “in these very special circumstances, 
basic principles of fairness should have counseled the adoption of a 
uniform standard to address the problem.”90 But many rulings impli-
cate principles of fairness without violating them, and to say that one 
course of action is better than a second is not to say that the second 
is unconstitutional. In his own opinion, Justice Breyer never stated 
that the Florida Supreme Court’s action violated equal protection or 
that the Constitution requires a uniform standard for evaluating un-
dervote ballots.91 
D.   Justices Stevens and Ginsburg 
 Justice Stevens, in an opinion joined by Justices Ginsburg and 
Breyer, denied that the Florida court’s failure to spell out more de-
tailed operational standards for the application of the intent of the 
voter standard created an equal protection problem. Noting that “we 
have never before called into question the substantive standard by 
                                                                                                                    
 87. Id. (citations omitted). 
 88. Id. at 133-35 (Souter, J., dissenting). By contrast, Justices Stevens and Ginsburg 
joined Justice Souter’s opinion except for the part of his opinion finding an equal protection 
violation. Id. at 129. 
 89. Id. at 125 (Stevens, J., dissenting).  
 90. Id. at 145-46 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). 
 91. The portion of Justice Breyer’s opinion analyzing the equal protection question 
was joined by Justice Souter but not by Justices Stevens and Ginsburg, suggesting perhaps 
that his Supreme Court colleagues thought Justice Breyer was agreeing with Justice 
Souter even if Justice Breyer’s language did not go quite that far. 
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which a State determines that a vote has been legally cast,”92 Justice 
Stevens concluded there was “no reason to think that the guidance 
provided [by that standard] is any less sufficient—or will lead to re-
sults any less uniform—than, for example, the ‘beyond a reasonable 
doubt’ standard employed everyday by ordinary citizens in court-
rooms across this country.”93 He concluded that the concern over dif-
ferent standards in different counties was “alleviated—if not elimi-
nated—by the fact that a single impartial magistrate will ultimately 
adjudicate all objections arising from the recount process.”94 He also 
suggested that one implication of the Court’s decision is that “Flor-
ida’s decision to leave to each county the determination of what bal-
loting system to employ—despite enormous differences in accuracy—
might run afoul of equal protection.”95 
 In her separate opinion, Justice Ginsburg, joined by Justice Ste-
vens, was even more dismissive of the equal protection claim. Noting 
that “we live in an imperfect world, one in which thousands of votes 
have not been counted,” she could not “agree that the recount 
adopted by the Florida court, flawed as it may be, would yield a re-
sult any less fair or precise than the certification that preceded that 
recount.”96 
IV.   EQUAL PROTECTION AND THE FLORIDA SUPREME COURT’S 
MANUAL RECOUNT ORDER 
A.   The Equal Protection Clause and the Vote 
 There is no federal constitutional right to vote. The Constitution 
of its own force enfranchises no one. Article I, Section 2 sets the tone 
by looking to state law for the determination of who may vote in fed-
eral elections when it provides that the electorate for selecting mem-
bers of the House of Representatives shall consist of “Electors in each 
State [who] shall have the Qualifications requisite for Electors of the 
most numerous Branch of the State Legislature.” The Seventeenth 
Amendment makes the same provision for the electorate that chooses 
United States Senators. And, as we were so forcefully reminded by 
both Bush v. Palm Beach County Canvassing Board97 and Bush v. 
Gore,98 the Constitution gives the people no vote in the presidential 
                                                                                                                    
 92. Id. at 125 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 93. Id.  
 94. Id. at 126. 
 95. Id. 
 96. Id. at 143 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 97. 531 U.S. 70, 76-77 (2000). 
 98. 531 U.S. at 104 (“The individual citizen has no federal constitutional right to vote 
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election at all. As for the voting rights provisions of the Fifteenth, 
Nineteenth, Twenty-fourth and Twenty-sixth Amendments, none of 
these confer a right to vote in federal, state, or local elections. 
Rather, each is phrased in the negative, eliminating a qualification 
that a state or locality might otherwise have utilized to determine 
who may exercise the franchise but not requiring that anyone actu-
ally be enfranchised. 
 For most of American history, constitutional doctrine joined with 
constitutional text in denying the existence of a general constitution-
ally protected right to vote. In 1875, in Minor v. Happersett,99 the Su-
preme Court emphatically rejected the argument that the right to 
vote is a right of citizenship. In that case, Minor, a woman, argued 
that, by virtue of the Fourteenth Amendment’s declaration, “[a]ll 
persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the 
jurisdiction thereof” are citizens of the United States and of the 
states in which they reside. Minor was a citizen of Missouri and 
therefore asserted that she was entitled to vote in Missouri federal 
and state elections, notwithstanding the fact that Missouri law lim-
ited the franchise to men. The Supreme Court agreed that she was a 
citizen and thus a member of the “political community,”100 but found 
that citizenship had no relevance to the question of whether she was 
entitled to vote. Voting was simply not an attribute of citizenship. 
The scope of the franchise was a matter entirely for state determina-
tion, subject only to the Fifteenth Amendment’s preclusion of racial 
discrimination in voting. 
 Although Minor’s specific determination that a state could limit 
the vote to men was overturned by the Nineteenth Amendment, Mi-
nor’s central premise, that the Constitution provides no general pro-
tection for the right to vote, was still good law almost eighty-five 
years later. In 1959, in Lassiter v. Northampton County Board of 
Elections,101 the Court, noting that “[t]he States have long been held 
to have broad powers to determine the conditions under which the 
right of suffrage may be exercised,”102 upheld the constitutionality of 
a state literacy test. To be sure, the Court had become vigorous in de-
tecting and invalidating state suffrage laws that violated the Consti-
tution’s specific ban on racial discrimination, and the Court had re-
peatedly recognized Congress’s power to regulate the suffrage in fed-
eral elections. But apart from the voting criteria explicitly con-
demned by specific provisions of the Constitution, there was no fed-
eral constitutional protection of the right to vote. 
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 All that changed during the voting rights revolution of the 1960s 
and early 1970s. Beginning with the legislative apportionment 
cases,103 and then turning to restrictions on the franchise itself, the 
Supreme Court transformed the constitutional status of the vote. 
Voting became a fundamental right, with laws infringing that right 
subject to strict judicial scrutiny. In short order, the Court invali-
dated such longstanding limitations on suffrage such as the poll 
tax,104 property tax payment requirements,105 and durational resi-
dency requirements.106 The Court also established one person, one 
vote as the constitutional ground rule for political representation in 
elected bodies. Although the Court adhered to the traditional federal 
constitutional formula of invalidating criteria for voting rather than 
creating an affirmative entitlement to vote, the holdings and reason-
ing of the Court effectively established such an entitlement. Inclu-
sion and equality are the twin hallmarks of the new jurisprudence of 
voting rights. Once a state or locality provides that an election is 
used to fill a public office or to answer a governmental question, then 
all adult citizens who are residents of the jurisdiction are presump-
tively entitled to vote in that election, and all voters must have 
equally weighted votes. 
 Voting was transformed from a matter of legislative grace into a 
fundamental aspect of citizenship. A defining characteristic of citi-
zenship is the opportunity to participate in political decisionmaking. 
“Most citizens can achieve this participation only as qualified voters 
through the election of legislators to represent them. Full and effec-
tive participation by all citizens . . . requires, therefore, that each 
citizen have an equally effective voice in the election of” public offi-
cials.107 The assumption that citizenship means the right to vote was 
most clearly underscored in the way the Court in Reynolds v. Sims 
nonchalantly equated citizenship with the suffrage in the phrase “[a] 
citizen, a qualified voter.”108  
 The extension and protection of the right to vote was a critically 
important official public statement of the voter’s status as a citizen. 
Disenfranchisement and malapportionment were particularly trou-
bling not simply because they interfered with political participation 
but because they expressed a state’s determination that the excluded 
and the underrepresented were less than full citizens. 
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 The Court’s notion of the right to vote as a signifier of full citizen-
ship may also explain the handful of Court-approved exclusions from 
the franchise. Residency is the state and local equivalent of citizen-
ship; it determines whether one is a member of a particular state or 
local political community.109 As a result, nonresidents have no right 
to vote where they do not reside.110 Felons may be denied the fran-
chise in part because conviction of a felony has long had the meta-
phoric status of loss of political citizenship.111 Finally, the Court 
found that certain bodies, such as quasi-proprietary special districts, 
are not political communities. As such they lacked citizens, and citi-
zen entitlements to suffrage and equally weighted votes do not apply 
to voting arrangements in such special districts.112 
 In addition to tightly linking voting to citizenship, the Court justi-
fied its new protection of the franchise instrumentally. The vote is a 
critical tool that enables citizens to protect their rights and interests. 
“[T]he right to exercise the franchise in a free and unimpaired man-
ner is preservative of other basic civil and political rights.”113 Beyond 
rights, the franchise is the key means by which those affected by 
government actions can make their interests known and their voices 
heard.114 Universal adult citizen suffrage is thus necessary to legiti-
mate government as representative of the people. Only when all 
adult citizens are free to vote can we assume that elected officials are 
representative of and accountable to the people as a whole. 
 Finally, the Court defended its intervention in an area tradition-
ally left to the states in comparative institutional terms. Because the 
current distribution of the franchise and the current weighting of 
votes determines who holds political power, the political process 
could not be counted on to correct laws that result in disenfran-
chisement and underrepresentation:  
The presumption of constitutionality and the approval given “ra-
tional” classifications in other types of enactments are based on an 
assumption that the institutions of state government are struc-
tured so as to represent fairly all the people. However, when the 
challenge to the statute is in effect a challenge of this basic as-
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sumption, the assumption can no longer serve as the basis for pre-
suming constitutionality.115 
Judicial intervention was necessary—and strict judicial scrutiny of 
restrictions on the franchise was called for—because the self-favoring 
biases of political insiders, who were elected by a limited electorate 
or under voting rules that overrepresented some groups, made depar-
tures from universal adult resident citizenship and equally weighted 
votes both inherently suspect and unlikely to be corrected by the po-
litical branches without judicial intervention. 
 The overall thrust of the Court’s application of the Equal Protec-
tion Clause to the vote was the expansion of the franchise. In theory, 
the inequality created by laws that unequally enfranchised some and 
disenfranchised other similarly situated people could have been 
remedied by disenfranchising the enfranchised. But that result never 
occurred. In the right to vote cases, the Court’s focus was less on ine-
quality per se and more on extending the franchise to groups of adult 
resident citizens who had previously been excluded from voting. 
B.   Equal Protection and the Administration of Elections: 
Setting the Standard for Federal Judicial Intervention 
 As the Supreme Court noted in Bush v. Gore, constitutional pro-
tection of the right to vote goes well beyond “the initial allocation of 
the franchise.”116 Equal protection of the vote applies to the weighting 
of votes in the election of officials;117 the design of systems of repre-
sentation, including the drawing of legislative districts and the selec-
tion of single- or multi-member districts; and the rules, such as those 
regulating the ability of candidates and parties to get on the ballot, 
that determine the range of options available for casting one’s vote.118 
Equal protection could reasonably be extended to the state and local 
rules that govern the casting and counting of ballots. Certainly if a 
state law mandated the use of two different kinds of election machin-
ery, with different error rates, in different parts of the state, the vot-
ers in the area required to use the machine with the higher error 
rate—so that a higher percentage of their votes were legally ig-
nored—could reasonably contend that their votes were unconstitu-
tionally underweighted compared to the votes of residents with bet-
ter machinery. Similarly, if the state imposed a fee for submitting an 
absentee ballot, that fee could be challenged by voters unable to get 
to the polls as a form of wealth tax on voting and would be subjected 
to strict judicial scrutiny. So too, if county officials provided assis-
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tance to Republican party workers, but denied comparable assistance 
to Democrats in filling out absentee ballot applications, that would 
plainly be subject to constitutional challenge as partisan discrimina-
tion affecting the vote.119 
 Election administration practices, however, may present a more 
complicated problem for equal protection analysis than state laws af-
fecting the formal right to vote or the weighting of representation in 
a multi-member elected body. Whereas adult citizen suffrage and one 
person, one vote are well-established constitutional norms, there are 
no constitutionally mandatory standards or widely accepted re-
quirements for many aspects of the election process. To use just some 
of the examples that surfaced during the Florida recount struggle, 
there are multiple types of voting machinery, different types of ballot 
design, and a variety of requirements and procedures for casting ab-
sentee ballots and for protesting and contesting elections. To subject 
all of these diverse practices and rules to equal protection review 
could ultimately result in a federal court-ordered, nationwide stan-
dardization of the mechanics of elections. In many of these cases, the 
basis for a judicial determination of one constitutionally mandatory 
election procedure would be far from clear. Moreover, judicial stan-
dardization would undermine, if not end, the longstanding American 
tradition of decentralized control of elections—a tradition going back 
at least to the late eighteenth century when, according to Alexis de 
Tocqueville, Massachusetts local officials prepared the voting lists for 
state elections and transmitted the results of the local poll to state of-
ficials.120 Indeed, during much of American history, local govern-
ments set their own voting rules for participation in local elections. 
As a result, a person could be qualified to vote in a colonial or state 
election but not in a local election or vice versa.121  
 Of course, much as “it is revolting to have no better reason for a 
rule of law than that so it was laid down in the time of Henry IV,”122 
tradition alone cannot justify a practice inconsistent with current 
values. Decades of history did not save malapportionment and dur-
ational residency requirements when the Supreme Court began to 
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apply an equal protection analysis to voting and representation laws 
in the 1960s and 1970s. 
 Local decisionmaking, however, does continue to reflect and rein-
force important contemporary political values. Local decisionmaking 
curbs abuses of power by the upper level government; builds democ-
racy; increases the satisfaction of citizen preferences; and facilitates 
innovation, experimentation and political learning. De Tocqueville 
stressed the first two points in Democracy in America, when he fo-
cused on the political benefits of “Administrative Decentralization in 
the United States.”123 Given the absence of institutional curbs on 
state power, de Tocqueville found that the practice of decentraliza-
tion played an important role in preventing state tyranny.124 More-
over, de Tocqueville expressed the concern that the equality and in-
dividualism that accompany democracy can make it difficult for peo-
ple to cooperate and thus make them easy targets for despotism. By 
giving Americans an interest and an opportunity to participate in 
self-government—and thus a “habit and taste” for working together 
concerning public matters—local government strengthened Ameri-
cans’ commitment to their own freedom. In his view, local govern-
ment was a sort of “primary school” of democracy.125 Decentralized 
decisionmaking enabled people to become “citizens”; that is, active 
participants in self-governance who, due to that participation, would 
become committed to maintaining and defending self-government. 
Decentralization thus serves the same interests as voting itself. 
 Decentralized power as a break on centralized tyranny is still an 
important theme in contemporary arguments for decentralization. It 
may also be directly relevant to the conduct of manual recounts. As 
Judge Middlebrooks observed in rejecting a federal court challenge to 
the Florida 2000 presidential recounts then underway in Broward, 
Miami-Dade, Palm Beach, and Volusia Counties,  
[r]ather than a sign of weakness or constitutional injury, some sol-
ace can be taken in the fact that no one centralized body or person 
can control the tabulation of an entire statewide or national elec-
tion. For the more county boards and individuals involved in the 
electoral regulation process, the less likely it becomes that corrup-
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tion, bias, or error can influence the ultimate result of an elec-
tion.126 
Certainly, in the Florida recount fight it was striking how Secretary 
Harris’ decisions consistently favored the interests of her party’s 
candidate—whom she herself had served as state campaign co-chair 
during the election. In Florida, decentralization served to reduce the 
ability of one party to make all the administrative decisions affecting 
the recount. 
 Administrative decentralization may also be of value in building 
democracy and increasing the ability of government to satisfy diver-
gent preferences. Justice O’Connor emphasized these benefits of de-
centralized decisionmaking when she argued that “decentralized 
government . . . will be more sensitive to the diverse needs of a het-
erogeneous society; it increases opportunity for citizen involvement 
in democratic processes; [and] . . . it makes government more respon-
sive . . . .”127 These concerns seem apposite in the election administra-
tion setting. Election administration involves the juggling of multiple 
values: facilitating voting, promoting innovation, achieving accurate 
and timely tabulations, assuring fairness to candidates and parties, 
controlling costs, relying on volunteers to do the nitty-gritty of ad-
ministration,128 and permitting opportunities for challenges while 
also providing for finality of results. Different states and localities 
may balance these values differently and their different conclusions 
can affect the rules they adopt. 
 Decentralization is particularly valuable where there is no one 
right answer, reasonable people disagree, and those disagreements 
correlate with residence in a particular local government. People in 
rural areas may set the balance in one direction, and people in urban 
areas may set it differently. People in areas dominated by one ethnic 
group, social class, age group or first-time voters may have one pref-
erence, while other areas with different demographics might feel dif-
ferently. Where there is considerable intrastate disagreement on 
what the right rule ought to be—and no particular rule is constitu-
tionally required—a uniform, statewide rule could have the unfortu-
nate effect of forcing a lot of people to live under a rule they oppose. 
Decentralized decisionmaking, with local rules responsive to local 
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preferences, increases the number of people likely to be satisfied with 
the rule under which they are governed. 
 Decentralization and variation may also promote innovation. It 
may be easier to try out new forms of voting machinery, new types of 
ballot design, technological developments like electronic voting, or 
experiments like mail-in voting, two-day voting, or Sunday voting in 
one or a handful of jurisdictions rather than in the state or nation as 
a whole. Equal protection could jeopardize such innovation by requir-
ing the immediate statewide application of innovations in voting be-
fore any difficulties in administration or unintended consequences 
have been studied and resolved. Alternatively, innovation could be 
discouraged if the constitutionalization of questions of administra-
tion result in liability for jurisdictions whose innovations misfire and 
unintentionally burden voting. 
 This does not mean that local control of all aspects of election ad-
ministration is necessarily desirable. The Florida presidential re-
count revealed to the nation many of the shortcomings of local con-
trol—variations in the quality of election machinery that relate to 
differences in local resources; ill-considered judgments like Palm 
Beach County’s butterfly ballot; the close relationships between elec-
tion administrators and local party workers that affected applica-
tions for absentee ballots; and the lack of consistent standards for re-
solving questions concerning the validity of disputed ballots. State 
legislative determination of ballot design and more precise standards 
for resolving counting disputes, state financing of high-quality ma-
chinery for all counties, and vigorous state oversight of local election 
officials’ cooperation with party workers could certainly promote a 
more equitable, reliable, and effective electoral process. But, given 
both the tradition of decentralized administration and the values 
that support it, the determination of whether particular administra-
tive questions are resolved at the state or at the local level is primar-
ily a matter for the state political process, not federal constitutional 
law.  
 Certainly, local election administration may be marred by errors, 
irregularities and minor violations of state election laws that infringe 
the voters’ rights. Election machines can be improperly pro-
grammed,129 break down,130 or be installed too late for some voters to 
use.131 Ballots and absentee ballot applications can be mishandled.132 
The states, however, have rules and procedures for addressing these 
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“garden variety” election disputes.133 In the absence of a showing that 
these measures are insufficiently attentive to voting rights or that an 
election dispute raises more serious issues, there is little basis for 
federal judicial intervention. 
 Most problems of election administration, including rules—or vio-
lations of rules—that burden the vote in individual cases simply do 
not raise the kinds of concerns that triggered the Supreme Court’s 
intervention to protect voting rights. Random machine breakdowns, 
unpatterned mishandling of ballots, and intermittent irregularities 
in absentee ballots do not undermine the political rights of affected 
voters, signify that they are second-class citizens, or threaten their 
ability to advance their rights and interests in the political process. It 
will often not be known precisely which voters’ ballots were lost due 
to mechanical problems or election day errors, and voters whose bal-
lots were lost in a particular election or for a particular race are not 
entirely excluded from the electorate but may be able to vote in other 
elections or for other races in the same election. State remedies may 
be able to catch and correct errors or prevent their recurrence in the 
future. The voters affected by administrative mistakes are as much 
members of the polity, and able to vindicate their interests over time, 
as voters whose votes were counted. 
 Of course, to the extent that maladministration is intentional, re-
curring, predictable, and targeted at particular groups of voters, with 
state remedies failing to correct the problem, a constitutional prob-
lem is presented. Such administrative practices compromise the in-
tegrity of the election. The voters whose ballots are consistently not 
counted are burdened with a reduced opportunity to participate, are 
treated disrespectfully by their states, and suffer a reduction in their 
political power. They may be, for voting purposes, second-class citi-
zens. 
 In their cases dealing with problems of election administration, 
the lower federal courts have repeatedly distinguished between ordi-
nary, or “garden variety,” election irregularities and election prac-
tices that reach “the point of patent and fundamental unfairness.”134 
In cases involving such standard problems as “the malfunctioning of 
voting machines and innocent human errors,”135 the federal courts 
have deferred to state and local control of election administration 
and have avoided finding that election irregularities—including vio-
lations of state election laws and actions interfering with the ability 
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to cast a ballot or have it properly counted136—violated the constitu-
tional right to vote. On the other hand, election administrative ac-
tions involving racial discrimination,137 intentional and widespread 
disenfranchisement,138 or changes in election rules on which voters 
had reasonably relied to their detriment in deciding whether and 
how to vote,139 have been found to constitute the kind of fundamental 
unfairness that rises to the level of a constitutional violation. 
 The lower federal courts’ focus on fundamental unfairness not 
only holds together protection of the vote with respect for state and 
local control over elections, but it is also consistent with the Supreme 
Court’s approach in other settings for determining whether state 
laws burden voting rights. In the legislative apportionment context, 
for example, the Court has extended the right to an equally weighted 
vote from its original use in invalidating districts of unequal popula-
tion to partisan gerrymandering, recognizing that such gerrymander-
ing can diminish the effectiveness of the votes of political minori-
ties.140 But the adoption of a districting plan with the intent—and ef-
fect—of giving one party a higher percentage of legislative seats than 
its percentage of the popular vote (and the concomitant reduction in 
the percentage of seats relative to votes for the other parties) is not 
enough to sustain an action for unconstitutional partisan gerryman-
dering. Rather, the Court has held that in order to violate the Equal 
Protection Clause the gerrymander has to be so severe that it “will 
consistently degrade a voter’s or a group of voters’ influence on the 
political process as a whole.”141 In other words, intentional gerry-
mandering alone is not unconstitutional; only an intentional gerry-
mander that consistently undermines the votes of a partisan group 
over time is unconstitutional. 
 Similarly, the Court has recognized that state laws that limit the 
ability of third parties and independents to win a place on the ballot 
burden the rights of voters to cast effective votes.142 But the Court 
has held constitutional state laws requiring independents to demon-
strate some substantial level of support in order to be listed on the 
ballot;143 limiting the ability of primary election losers to run as inde-
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pendents in the general election;144 and refusing to count write-in bal-
lots.145 The right to vote includes a right to have choices, but laws 
limiting the range of choices do not unconstitutionally burden the 
right to vote. So long as a state’s laws provide minor parties and in-
dependents with a reasonable opportunity to get on the ballot, the 
state can enforce some laws that keep candidates and parties off the 
ballot even though that has the effect of narrowing the range of 
choices and, thus, constraining the right to vote. “Election laws will 
invariably impose some burden upon individual voters.”146 Only un-
duly burdensome limits on the ability of new parties and candidates 
to get on the ballot violate the right to vote. Where a state provides 
“adequate ballot access,” laws such as a ban on write-in voting are 
constitutional even though they impose a “burden on voters’ rights to 
make free choices and to associate politically through the vote.”147 
 Did the Florida Supreme Court’s order, with its tacit approval of 
varying county-level standards for determining whether an under-
vote ballot contained a legally valid vote, create a situation of fun-
damental unfairness for Florida’s presidential voters? That determi-
nation involves consideration of the constitutional status of the un-
dervote ballots, the cause of the variation in standards, and the justi-
fications for the Florida court’s action. The next three sections of this 
Part take up those issues. 
C.   The Uncertain Constitutional Status of Undervote Ballots 
 Are undervote ballots votes entitled to the full constitutional pro-
tection available to votes? The answer is not clear, but probably “no.” 
Conceivably, there could be three kinds of undervotes. First, there 
are ballots that show no markings whatsoever with respect to any of 
the presidential candidates. Such a ballot reflects the voter’s choice 
not to vote for President. The voter might have come to the polls to 
vote in another race but decided not to vote in the presidential elec-
tion. There is no dispute that such ballots should be treated as non-
votes. Second, some undervotes might be attributable to machine er-
ror. Such a ballot would have been properly marked, with the chad 
cleanly detached, but for some reason the vote-counting machinery 
failed to record a vote. There was no question that a voter who cast 
such a ballot is entitled to have that ballot counted as a vote. The 
crux of the conflict in Bush v. Gore was a third type of undervote: a 
ballot that reflects some marking of the ballot card next to a presi-
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dential candidate’s name but not enough to detach the chad, thereby 
causing the ballot-counting machinery to treat the ballot as not in-
cluding a choice of candidate for President. 
 Under Florida law and the law of many states, such imperfectly 
marked ballots may be valid where the markings reflect the intent of 
the voter to cast a ballot. But not all markings on a ballot demon-
strate the intent of the voter to cast that ballot. Some markings are 
just stray marks. Others may be indications of a tentative disposition 
to cast the ballot followed by a final decision not to. In other words, 
some but not all imperfectly marked ballots are votes, while some 
imperfectly marked ballots are not votes.  
 There is no federal constitutional or statutory standard for deter-
mining what counts as a valid ballot, and Bush v. Gore declined to 
establish one. Although some states, by legislative or judicial ruling, 
have adopted relatively specific standards, there is no consistency 
across the states. Different state standards include requiring the 
chad be detached in two corners,148 requiring only that some light 
penetrate the ballot,149 or accepting dimples or indentations without 
any detachment or penetration at all.150 Many states have no clearly 
articulated standard more precise than the intent of the voter.151 In 
Florida, prior to the 2000 election, neither the legislature, nor the 
Secretary of State—as the state’s chief administrative officer with re-
sponsibility for elections—nor the courts had spelled out criteria for 
the determination of when an undervote ballot demonstrates the in-
tent of the voter to cast a vote. 
 Constitutional protection of the vote does not require the broadest 
possible definition of a validly cast undervote ballot. The determina-
                                                                                                                    
 148. See, e.g., In re Issue 27 Election of November 4, 1997, 693 N.E.2d 1190, 1191 (Ohio 
Com. Pl. 1998) (holding that a ballot will be counted only if marked by a “hanging chad,” 
that is, a chad “attached by two or less corners”); cf. Duffy v. Mortenson, 497 N.W.2d 437, 
439-40 (S.D. 1993) (finding that a ballot must be counted where two of the four corners of 
the chad were detached). 
 149. See, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 3-12-1-9.5(c) (Michie 2000) (“A chad that has been 
pierced, but not entirely punched out of the card, shall be counted . . . .”); id. § 3-12-1-9.5(d) 
(“A chad that has been indented, but not in any way separated from the remainder of the 
card may not be counted . . . .”). 
 150. See, e.g., TEX. ELEC. CODE ANN. § 127.130(d)(3) (Vernon 2000) (A ballot may be 
counted where “an indentation on the chad from the stylus or other object is present and 
indicates a clearly ascertainable intent of the voter to vote”); Delahunt v. Johnston, 671 
N.E.2d 1241, 1243 (Mass. 1996) (“[T]he presence of a discernible impression made by a sty-
lus” counts as a clear indication of a voter’s intent.). 
 151. See, e.g., Pullen v. Mulligan, 561 N.E.2d 585, 610 (Ill. 1990).  
Although the legislature certainly has the power to provide a mandatory stan-
dard for marking punch card ballots, as it did for the marking of paper ballots, 
no such standard has been set out in the Election Code. We would be usurping 
the power of the legislature if we were to infer such a standard in the Election 
Code and then conclude that the legislature intended such standard to be given 
a mandatory construction. 
Id. 
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tion of whether an imperfectly marked ballot contains a vote involves 
the balancing of a variety of competing concerns. These include as-
suring that all votes are counted, avoiding the mistaken tabulation of 
nonvotes, and maintaining the political neutrality of the process. Re-
specting the intent of the voter entails both counting all ballots in-
tentionally cast and not counting ballots not intended to be cast for a 
candidate. Moreover, some standards, like the inclusion of dimpled or 
indented ballots, are less precise than the requirements of detach-
ments or penetration by light. So there is a tension between the 
benefits of a more inclusive standard in assuring that all intention-
ally cast ballots are counted and the dangers of giving a greater role 
to the subjective perceptions of the individual ballot counters.  
 In the right to vote cases, universal suffrage was a presumption of 
democratic theory and quickly became a constitutional benchmark. 
The denial of the right to vote was an unusual deviation from the suf-
frage norm that had to be justified. Although in the legislative appor-
tionment context, there was no universal practice of equipopulous 
representation, the one person, one vote principle quickly emerged 
because of its close correspondence with notions of majority rule and 
equal voting rights and its relative ease of administration. But there 
is no comparable baseline in state electoral practices or democratic 
theory for deciding how to count imperfectly marked ballots. The 
Constitution does not require a specific test for counting undervotes, 
nor does it necessarily prefer a more inclusionary approach over a 
more restrictive one. Presumably, each of the tests employed by the 
states and by the individual county canvassing teams in Florida—
partially detached chad, pierced chad, and dimpled chad—were con-
stitutional. In any event, the Court made no statement that any of 
the divergent standards, including the most restrictive, was invalid. 
Thus, it would not have been an unconstitutional infringement on 
the right to vote if any counting team—or all the counting teams—
had adopted a relatively restrictive approach to applying the intent 
of the voter standard and had excluded most of the imperfectly 
marked ballots, even if they contained discernable marks. 
 Indeed, three members of the Court—constituting a majority of 
those who signed the per curiam opinion—indicated their view that 
as a matter of Florida law none of the imperfectly marked ballots 
should be counted as valid votes. Chief Justice Rehnquist, joined by 
Justices Scalia and Thomas, pointing to the directive given to Florida 
voters to “AFTER VOTING, CHECK YOUR BALLOT CARD TO BE 
SURE YOUR VOTING SELECTIONS ARE CLEARLY AND 
CLEANLY PUNCHED AND THERE ARE NO CHIPS LEFT 
HANGING ON THE BACK OF THE CARD,” as well as to the spe-
cific provisions of the Florida election contest law, concluded that bal-
lots not counted by properly functioning machinery because the bal-
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lots were imperfectly marked should not be counted at all.152 Florida’s 
Secretary of State had taken the same position, arguing in effect that 
the only undervotes that should be counted are those that a properly 
functioning machine would have registered. Implicitly, Chief Justice 
Rehnquist and Justices Scalia and Thomas must have concluded that 
failure to count all imperfectly marked ballots was constitutional. 
The concurring Justices actually used the term “improperly marked,” 
suggesting that the voters were somehow at fault for the failure to 
register a proper vote. For the concurring group at least, a complete 
exclusion of imperfectly marked ballots does not deny equal protec-
tion of the laws to the voters whose ballots were not counted since 
those voters had no right to have their ballots counted at all.  
 The concurring opinion aside, there was nothing in the per curiam 
opinion that indicated that a voter who casts any particular sort of 
imperfectly marked ballot had any substantive entitlement to have 
that ballot treated as a valid vote. Indeed, the per curiam Justices, 
like their concurring brethren, also appeared to conclude that under-
vote ballots were of minimal constitutional status. As the per curiam 
opinion observed in finding that the Florida Supreme Court’s certifi-
cation of Miami-Dade County’s partial recount results violated equal 
protection, “[t]he press of time does not diminish the constitutional 
concern. A desire for speed is not a general excuse for ignoring equal 
protection guarantees.”153 If equal protection guarantees applied to 
imperfectly marked ballots, then presumably even “the press of time” 
would not have justified the failure to review them. Yet the effect of 
the per curiam decision was to terminate the recount of Florida’s un-
dervote ballots because of the impending federal statutory safe har-
bor deadline—in other words, “the press of time.” If “the press of 
time” does not excuse ignoring equal protection guarantees but does 
require the termination of the statewide manual recount of under-
vote ballots, then, logically, those ballots are not entitled to much 
protection under the Equal Protection Clause. 
 Imperfectly marked ballots appear to fall into a constitutional 
gray area. They might be votes and they might not be votes. That 
does not mean that such ballots must be ignored. A state or locality 
may choose to go beyond the constitutionally mandated right to vote 
                                                                                                                    
 152. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 119 (2000). That was also the view of three members of 
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit who dissented from that court’s affir-
mance of the district court’s refusal to preliminarily enjoin, on equal protection grounds, 
the manual recounts under way before Gore v. Harris. See Touchston v. McDermott, 234 
F.3d 1133, 1141-45 (11th Cir. 2000) (Tjoflat, J., dissenting, joined by Birch and Dubina, 
JJ.). 
 153. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. at 108. 
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and enfranchise those, such as noncitizens154 or nonresidents,155 who 
do not have a constitutional entitlement to vote but have a sufficient 
tie to the polity that it is reasonable to include them. Such an exten-
sion of the franchise does not unconstitutionally “dilute” the votes of 
the members of the electorate who are constitutionally entitled to 
vote.156 As a result, even if Florida did not have to count the under-
vote ballots, the state could do so. Any undervote ballots found to re-
flect an intent to vote for a presidential candidate and added to the 
tally would not have unconstitutionally diluted the votes recorded by 
machines. 157  
 The uncertain constitutional status of the undervote ballot does 
not mean that the Equal Protection Clause does not apply when 
some imperfectly marked ballots are reviewed and counted and some 
are not. Certainly, it would be unconstitutional for a canvassing 
board to count only those undervote ballots marked for a Democrat 
while ignoring those marked for a Republican. But the status of the 
undervote ballots—the fact that they could be ignored and that no 
particular criterion for counting such a ballot is either constitution-
ally mandated or clearly implicated by constitutional protection of 
the vote—affects the sense of whether variations in the standards for 
assessing undervote ballots creates an equal protection violation.  
 The only voters in Florida’s 2000 presidential election who were 
arguably denied equal protection by the manual recount order were 
those who cast imperfectly marked ballots that might have been 
treated as valid in a county applying a liberal “intent of the voter” 
standard but whose ballots would not have been found valid in the 
voter’s own county. Such a voter has no constitutional entitlement to 
have her ballot reviewed at all and certainly has no entitlement to 
have her ballot reviewed under a liberal intent standard. The state 
could have adopted a restrictive, detached chad standard that would 
                                                                                                                    
 154. See, e.g., Jamin B. Raskin, Legal Aliens, Local Citizens: The Historical, Constitu-
tional and Theoretical Meanings of Alien Suffrage, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 1391, 1460-67 
(1993). 
 155. See, e.g., May v. Town of Mountain Vill., 132 F.2d 576, 582 (10th Cir. 1997). 
 156. See Briffault, supra note 112, at 398-99.  
 157. Plaintiffs in Siegel v. LePore and Touchston v. McDermott who challenged the 
manual recounts ordered by the local canvassing boards in Broward, Miami-Dade, Palm 
Beach, and Volusia Counties were voters in other parts of the state who claimed that the 
inclusion of manually recounted ballots would “dilute” their votes. Those claims were con-
sistently rejected by the federal courts that heard them. See Touchston v. McDermott, 120 
F. Supp. 2d 1055 (M.D. Fla 2000), aff’d, 234 F.3d 1133 (11th Cir. 2000) (en banc); Siegel v. 
LePore, 120 F. Supp. 2d 1041 (S.D. Fla. 2000), aff’d, 234 F.3d 1163 (11th Cir. 2000) (en 
banc). Judge Middlebrooks, the trial judge in Siegel, was particularly critical of the vote di-
lution theory, noting that a recount “strives to strengthen rather than dilute the right to 
vote by securing, as near as humanly possible, an accurate and true reflection of the will of 
the electorate.” Siegel, 120 F. Supp. 2d at 1050. The Supreme Court denied the petitions 
for writ of certiorari in both cases. See Touchston v. McDermott, 531 U.S. 1061 (2001); 
Siegel v. LePore, 531 U.S. 1005 (2000). 
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have treated all dented, dimpled, or pierced chads as no-votes. It is 
difficult to see the constitutional harm to those voters whose ballots 
may constitutionally be treated as no-votes and might still be treated 
as no-votes under a consistent statewide standard if similar ballots 
are tabulated in other parts of the state. In the absence of the adop-
tion of a standard intentionally discriminating against a group or 
groups of voters, a variation in the standards for counting undervote 
ballots does not create an equal protection problem.  
 Indeed, in other cases the Supreme Court has suggested that 
when a state’s voting rules go beyond what the Constitution requires 
in vindicating the right to vote, the distinctions the state draws in 
providing more generous rules are subject to rational basis review 
rather than the strict scrutiny ordinarily applied to discriminations 
affecting the vote. This is true even if the result is that some voters 
are benefited while others are not. Thus, in McDonald v. Board of 
Election Commissioners,158 the Court applied only rational basis re-
view and upheld an Illinois law that made absentee ballots available 
to voters who could not go to the polls for medical reasons as well as 
to voters who were away from their home county, but not to voters 
unable to go to the polls because they were jailed in their home coun-
ties. Noting that Illinois had no obligation to provide absentee ballots 
at all, the Court treated the absentee ballot law as an instance of the 
legislature’s traditional authority  
to take reform “one step at a time, addressing itself to the phase of 
the problem which seems most acute to the legislative mind.” . . . 
[A] legislature need not run the risk of losing an entire remedial 
scheme simply because it failed, through inadvertence or other-
wise, to cover every evil that might conceivably have been at-
tacked.159  
The Court then sustained the limited availability of absentee bal-
lots.160 
 In short, in the absence of a showing that the variations in stan-
dards for evaluating undervote ballots were intended to benefit the 
voters in some counties or burden those in others—or that the incon-
sistencies were intended to benefit or burden other identifiable 
                                                                                                                    
 158. 394 U.S. 802 (1969). 
 159. Id. at 809 (citation omitted). 
 160. Id. at 809-11. McDonald’s specific ruling—upholding the constitutionality of the 
denial of absentee ballots to pretrial detainees incarcerated in their home counties—was 
overruled five years later in O’Brien v. Skinner, 414 U.S. 524 (1974). McDonald had fo-
cused on the fact that the detainees had failed to demonstrate that, without absentee bal-
lots, they were unable to vote. In O’Brien, the plaintiffs made such a showing and the 
Court found that their inability to get to the polls was due entirely to their detention by 
the state. Thus, denial of absentee ballots was tantamount to denial of the vote. Of course, 
in Gore v. Harris, there was no claim that the state had prevented the voters who cast im-
perfectly marked ballots from casting proper ballots. 
362  FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 29:325 
 
groups of voters or particular candidates—variations in the stan-
dards for reviewing undervote ballots would not create an equal pro-
tection claim. Of course, a finding of geographic discrimination was 
central to Bush v. Gore’s holding. Yet, as I will indicate in the next 
section, any geographical variations in counting standards that 
might have occurred were not unconstitutional discriminations. 
D.   Geographic Discrimination and the Undervote 
 The Bush v. Gore per curiam sought to tie its reversal of the Flor-
ida court’s manual recount order to an important theme in the Su-
preme Court’s voting rights jurisprudence—the prohibition of geo-
graphic discrimination. Indeed, the revolution in voting rights juris-
prudence of the 1960s began with the problem of state laws favoring 
voters in some areas over voters in other areas, rather than with the 
right to vote per se. As the per curiam explained: 
 An early case in our one-person, one-vote jurisprudence arose 
when a State accorded arbitrary and disparate treatment to voters 
in its different counties. Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368 (1963). The 
Court found a constitutional violation. We relied on these princi-
ples in the context of the Presidential selection process in Moore v. 
Ogilvie, 394 U.S. 814 (1969), where we invalidated a county-based 
procedure that diluted the influence of citizens in larger counties 
in the nominating process.161 
 Gray v. Sanders162 involved Georgia’s use of the county unit rule 
in primary elections that selected the Democratic nominees for 
statewide office. Under the unit rule, votes were counted within 
counties; the candidate who got a plurality of votes within that 
county won the “county unit” votes allocated to that county. The 
county unit votes were then tabulated to determine the primary win-
ner. The allocation of the county unit votes overrepresented the least 
populous counties. The Supreme Court held that such a weighting of 
the primary vote to favor the least populated counties—in practice, 
the rural counties—was unconstitutional.163 Moreover, the Court in-
dicated that even if the malapportionment had been cured and each 
county had received its fair share of the unit votes, the winner-take-
all aspect of unit voting, which in effect disregarded the votes of all 
but the winning candidate in each county, would have rendered the 
system unconstitutional.164  
                                                                                                                    
 161. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 107 (2000). 
 162. 372 U.S. 368 (1962). 
 163. Id. at 379. 
 164. Id. at 381 n.12. 
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 Moore v. Ogilvie165 also involved a state law that formally favored 
less populous counties. Illinois law provided that in order to be 
placed on the ballot, independent candidates for President had to se-
cure, inter alia, petition signatures from 200 voters from each of fifty 
counties. Given the enormous variation in county populations in the 
state, “[t]his law . . . discriminates against the residents of the popu-
lous counties of the State in favor of rural sections.”166 
 The intercounty variations in the Florida Supreme Court’s man-
ual recount order differed from the geographic discriminations in 
Gray and Moore in three important ways. First, unlike the county 
unit rule and the county signature requirements, the intercounty dif-
ferences in assessing imperfectly marked ballots were not com-
manded by the state. They were the results of local decisionmaking. 
The state supreme court had not required a more inclusive rule in 
some counties and a more restrictive rule in others. If voters in some 
counties were disfavored relative to voters in other counties, that was 
the result of the actions of decisionmakers in the voters’ own coun-
ties, not the state supreme court. This is very significant. Whereas in 
Gray and Moore the voters in the disfavored counties would have had 
to persuade a legislature composed of representatives of both favored 
and disfavored counties to change the rules—which was not likely to 
succeed and was likely, instead, to result in the perpetuation of the 
discrimination against populous areas—in Florida any county utiliz-
ing a more restrictive undervote assessment rule could, on its own, 
change that rule to a more inclusive one.  
 Second, the variations in Florida were unpatterned whereas in 
Gray and Moore the state laws favored a specific interest group, rural 
voters, over another group, the residents of populous urban areas. In 
Gore v. Harris, not only did the state supreme court not determine 
which county must use a restrictive rule and which must use an in-
clusive rule, but there was also no claim or evidence that the differ-
ences in ballot assessment standards mapped on to any “independ-
ently identifiable group or category . . . .”167 As a result, the variation 
in counting standards would have been comparable to the West Vir-
ginia constitutional provision requiring bond issue ballot propositions 
to receive 60 percent of the vote in order to pass. Although that pro-
vision gave greater weight to the votes of voters in a 40.1 percent to 
49.9 percent minority than to voters in a 50.1 percent to 59.9 percent 
majority, the Supreme Court in Gordon v. Lance upheld the super-
majority voting rule, finding that “[u]nlike the restrictions in our 
                                                                                                                    
 165. 394 U.S. 814 (1969). 
 166. Id. at 819. 
 167. Gordon v. Lance, 403 U.S. 1, 5 (1971). 
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previous cases, the West Virginia Constitution singles out no ‘dis-
crete and insular minority’ for special treatment.”168  
 Indeed, the variations in Florida’s manual recount standards may 
have actually been less troubling than the variations in undervote 
rates attributable to the use of different kinds of election machinery. 
To the extent that Florida’s counties chose between punch card and 
optical scan technologies based on cost, and to the extent that those 
choices correlated with each county’s per capita tax base, then the 
differences in the ability to cast an effective vote would begin to cor-
relate with local wealth. Although not exactly a poll tax, such a rela-
tionship between wealth and voting ability, if proven, would surely 
raise a constitutional question. By contrast, there was no apparent 
connection between local wealth and the choice of manual recount 
standard.   
 Finally, unlike the county unit rule in Gray, the Florida Supreme 
Court’s order would not have resulted in the disregarding of any 
counted ballots. In Gray, votes cast for a candidate who failed to 
carry the voters’ county were effectively ignored in the final decision 
(much as the votes for a presidential candidate who fails to carry a 
state are effectively ignored in the selection of presidential electors). 
Under the Florida court’s order, all ballots that had been counted 
would have been tabulated in the final total. 
 To be sure, the order in Gore v. Harris would have resulted in the 
differential treatment of comparable undervote ballots depending on 
where they had been cast. But unlike the two cases cited by the per 
curiam, Gray and Moore, there was no state-mandated discrimina-
tion, and indeed, no discrimination with respect to a constitutionally 
protected vote. Nor did the recount order expressly or impliedly favor 
one candidate or one set of voters over another candidate or set of 
voters.  
 The lack of any partisan bias in the recount order can be favorably 
contrasted with the county-level recounts undertaken during the pro-
test phase of the Florida election battle and the Florida court’s order 
to include the results of the Miami-Dade and Palm Beach county re-
count results in the candidates’ vote tallies. The county-level re-
counts potentially injected political bias in the Florida statewide 
tally. Those recounts resulted from the decisions of the Gore cam-
paign to target counties which had given Gore majorities. That action 
was not unreasonable. Under Florida law, protests are filed and deci-
sions whether or not to undertake a recount are made at the county 
level.169 In the absence of any legislative provision for a statewide 
protest, it would have been logistically difficult for a candidate to 
                                                                                                                    
 168. Id.  
 169. FLA. STAT. § 102.166 (2000) (amended 2001). 
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seek a statewide precertification recount. Gore would have had to file 
in sixty-seven separate counties, and even if he had done so there 
was no guarantee that a statewide recount would have resulted be-
cause each county had the discretion to decline to undertake a re-
count. Indeed, if the preliminary sampling recount had failed to de-
tect an appreciable discrepancy between machine and manually 
counted ballots in a particular county,170 that county canvassing 
board probably could not have ordered a recount even if there were 
some undervote ballots in the county that might generate legally 
valid votes. 
 Thus, Gore reasonably targeted his recount efforts on the counties 
that he thought would generate the most additional votes for him. 
But this meant that the protest period recount was tilted in favor of 
the Democratic candidate and Democratic voters. To be sure, the fact 
that Gore asked for a recount did not mean that a county canvassing 
board was required to grant his request. Indeed, Miami-Dade 
County, after initially granting the request, rescinded its vote and 
terminated its recount.171 But the impetus for the recounts came from 
the Democrats, thus skewing the recount’s focus in the Democrats’ 
direction. A selective manual recount focused on particular counties 
or territorial subdivisions of the state is not necessarily unconstitu-
tional. A selective recount could be justified by a combination of fac-
tors, including time constraints precluding a complete statewide re-
count and the utilitarian benefits of focusing the limited recount op-
portunity on those areas which, due to large populations and high 
percentages of undervotes linked to the use of particular voting ma-
chinery, potentially provide the most undervotes. But in the 2000 
Florida election’s protest phase, the selective recounts were driven in 
large measure by partisan strategies and certainly had predictable 
partisan consequences.172 Indeed, one of the appealing features of the 
                                                                                                                    
 170. Id. § 102.166(4) (amended 2001). 
 171. 36 DAYS, supra note 13, at 133-35. The Florida Supreme Court unanimously re-
jected Gore’s request that Miami-Dade be compelled to resume the recount. Gore v. Miami-
Dade County Canvassing Bd., 780 So. 2d 913 (Fla. 2000); see also 36 DAYS, supra note 13, 
at 142. 
 172. The Bush campaign advanced this argument in its unsuccessful effort to obtain a 
preliminary injunction against county level recounts. The Eleventh Circuit’s per curiam 
opinion did not expressly consider the argument that the selective county recounts were 
unconstitutional. Rather, the court found that Bush had failed to establish one of the req-
uisites for a preliminary injunction—substantial likelihood of irreparable injury. The court 
reasoned that, at the time of the court’s decision, Bush was “suffering no serious harm, let 
alone irreparable harm,” since he had been certified the winner of Florida’s electoral votes 
notwithstanding the inclusion of some manually recounted ballots. Siegel v. LePore, 234 
F.3d 1163, 1177 (11th Cir. 2000) (en banc). Chief Judge Anderson, concurring specially, 
reached the merits of the question of whether the recounts were unconstitutional. He de-
termined that due to the facts that both candidates had the opportunity to seek recounts, 
the county canvassing boards had complete discretion to reject a recount request, and the 
recounts themselves were “untainted by partisan manipulation,” the selective manual re-
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Florida Supreme Court’s decision in Gore v. Harris is its correction of 
the partisan skew that resulted from the selective recounts under-
taken in the protest phase.  
 The role of partisan strategy in the selection of ballots for a par-
tial manual recount explains why the portion of the Florida Supreme 
Court’s order directing the inclusion of the Palm Beach and partial 
Miami-Dade recount results in the candidates’ vote totals violated 
equal protection principles, as Bush v. Gore held. According to the 
United States Supreme Court, the Palm Beach and Miami-Dade re-
counts were not limited to the review of undervote ballots but also 
included valid votes found through the review of overvotes—that is, 
ballots treated as void because they reflected votes for more than two 
candidates. Overvotes that turned out to be valid votes involved bal-
lots in which a voter punched out a candidate’s chad and also wrote 
in the same candidate’s name. Although such ballots would be re-
jected by a machine as votes for two different candidates, they 
plainly indicated the intent of the voter to vote for just one candidate. 
 It would be constitutional to focus a manual recount on under-
votes and exclude overvotes—as the Florida Supreme Court did. As 
strict scrutiny ought not apply to distinctions in no-vote ballots 
which constitutionally could be completely ignored, the decision of a 
court or election administration panel to focus a recount on under-
votes and to exclude overvotes should be subject to the rational basis 
test, not strict scrutiny. Given the data indicating considerable posi-
tive correlation between a county’s use of punch card machinery and 
its undervote rate173—and the lack of a similar correlation with re-
spect to overvotes—it would be reasonable to infer that, at least in 
punch card counties, some significant fraction of undervotes con-
sisted of failed efforts to register a preference. On the contrary, over-
votes were more likely to involve either voter mistakes or efforts to 
register two preferences. As a result, it would be reasonable to con-
clude that undervote ballots are more likely than overvote ballots to 
include legal votes.174 With the presidential recount subject to severe 
time constraints, a state could reasonably seek to reconcile its legiti-
                                                                                                                    
counts were not unconstitutional. Id. at 1182-86 (Anderson, C.J., concurring specially). 
Three members of the court dissented, finding, inter alia, that the selective recounts 
amounted to partisan discrimination. Id. at 1202-09. (Birch, J., dissenting, joined by 
Tjoflat and Dubina, JJ.)  
 173. 36 DAYS, supra note 13, at 191. 
 174. The discovery that some overvote ballots consisted of punched-out and written-in 
votes for the same candidate suggests that there may have been more valid votes on over-
vote ballots than was generally assumed. Nevertheless, given the differences between un-
dervote and overvote ballots and the problems with the punch card machinery associated 
with some of the undervote ballots, it would have been reasonable, even if mistaken, to as-
sume that undervote ballots would be a greater source of valid votes—and, thus, the prin-
cipal target for a time-constrained manual recount—than overvote ballots. 
2001]                          EQUAL PROTECTION 367 
 
mate goals of counting as many valid ballots as possible and meeting 
the statutory deadlines for participating in the presidential selection 
process by focusing on the undervote. So, too, it would not necessarily 
be unconstitutional to combine a statewide recount of the undervote 
with a partial recount of the overvote. Again, the combination of tight 
time constraints, the effort to maximize the vote count, and the use 
of nondiscriminatory criteria for selecting those counties in which to 
undertake the overvote partial recount would mean that a recount 
consisting of a statewide count of the undervote and a partial count 
of the overvote could be reasonable.  
 But if the counties in which the manual recount of the overvote 
took place were selected to advance partisan interests, then the fair-
ness of the resulting vote count would be tainted. That is apparently 
what happened in Florida. Palm Beach and Miami-Dade Counties 
were selected for recounts by the Democrats because they were car-
ried by the Democratic candidate. If, as a result of the Florida Su-
preme Court’s order, votes were obtained from the recount of over-
votes in those two counties but from no other counties in the state, 
that would have biased the result in favor of Gore. Thus, the United 
States Supreme Court was right to determine that the Florida court’s 
inclusion of votes obtained from the recount of the overvote ballots in 
those counties was unconstitutional.175 
 The selective protest phase recounts and the inclusion of the over-
vote recount results from the counties selected by the Democrats 
thus present serious issues of partisan bias. But the Florida Supreme 
Court’s order directing a statewide manual recount of undervote bal-
lots did not have a similar partisan tilt. There was no reason to as-
sume that the lack of consistent statewide standards was intended to 
favor one candidate and that candidate’s voters over the other candi-
date and his voters, or that it would have had the effect of doing so. 
There was no evidence that geographic variation was a disguised 
form of partisan manipulation.176 
                                                                                                                    
 175. Presumably, had Gore prevailed on the recount, Bush could have raised a similar 
argument with respect to the inclusion in the statewide result certified by Secretary Harris 
of votes obtained from recounting the overvote in heavily Democratic Broward County. 
 176. The Bush v. Gore per curiam also expressed concern that the Florida Supreme 
Court’s certification of a partial total from Miami-Dade gave “no assurance that the re-
counts included in a final certification must be complete.” 531 U.S. 98, 108 (2000). The im-
plication is that it would be unconstitutional to certify a partial recount result. That seems 
mistaken. Given that the Court was willing to permit the certification of a partial tally—
Secretary Harris’ certification included valid votes found by manual recounts undertaken 
in Broward and Volusia Counties but ignored any valid votes that a manual recount might 
have found in Florida’s other counties—a partial count, particularly a partial count that 
picks up some but not all of the votes missed by the vote-counting machinery, does not 
deny equal protection. The voters whose ballots are not counted in the recount are not 
made worse off by the fact that a partial recount picked up valid votes cast by other voters. 
A constitutional objection would arise only if the partial count is skewed to benefit particu-
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E.   Fundamental Fairness and the Recount Order 
 Apart from the inclusion of the Palm Beach and Miami-Dade re-
count results, the Florida recount order did not create a problem of 
fundamental unfairness. The recount order did not violate the right 
to vote or the right to an equally weighted vote. To the limited extent 
that the variations in counting standards created equal protection 
problems, those variations were justified by the Florida court’s effort 
to maximize the ability of Florida voters to have their ballots counted 
while avoiding the constraints on judicial innovation in the presiden-
tial election context imposed by the United States Supreme Court in 
Bush v. Palm Beach County Canvassing Board.177 
 The hallmarks of electoral unfairness have been the disenfran-
chisement of voters and intentional discrimination against voters. 
The leading lower court cases involving the invalidation of election 
practices on federal constitutional grounds have involved state or lo-
cal rescission of rules on which voters had reasonably relied in decid-
ing how to vote. In Griffin v. Burns,178 for example, state election offi-
cials told Rhode Island voters that they could vote by absentee or 
shut-in ballots in party primaries. After an election in which nearly 
ten percent of the total vote recorded was cast by absentee or shut-in 
ballots, the Rhode Island Supreme Court held that the use of absen-
tee or shut-in ballots in primaries was unauthorized by state law and 
invalidated those ballots. The First Circuit held that the state court’s 
action “severely impugned” the integrity of the election and 
amounted to “patent and fundamental unfairness” since the voters 
had reasonably relied on well-established practice, and the state 
court’s order thus unfairly disenfranchised them.179 
 In Roe v. State of Alabama,180 a case heavily relied on by Bush in 
his effort to block the Florida recounts, the Eleventh Circuit found 
that an Alabama court’s postelection order, which departed from past 
practice and required election officials to count absentee ballots that 
did not include notarization and the signatures of two qualified wit-
                                                                                                                    
lar voters. Miami-Dade had been selected for a recount because of its Democratic majority, 
and the precincts in Miami-Dade that had already been counted might have been selected 
for partisan reasons. As a result, the Florida court’s inclusion of the partial Miami-Dade 
results before the general statewide recount was undertaken was an error. But it should 
have been constitutionally permissible to include partial recount results when a full re-
count is impossible due to the federal timetable for the selection of presidential electors, 
provided that the counties and precincts that were counted were not selected on a partisan 
basis. 
 177. 531 U.S. 70 (2000).  
 178. 570 F.2d 1065 (1st Cir. 1978). 
 179. Id. at 1078; see also Partido Nuevo Progresista v. Barreto Perez, 639 F.2d 825, 827 
(1st Cir. 1980) (finding that disenfranchisement was crucial to Griffin’s holding). 
 180. 43 F.3d 574 (11th Cir. 1995). 
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nesses required by law, “implicate[d] fundamental fairness.”181 The 
Eleventh Circuit rejected the argument that the state court’s accep-
tance of otherwise invalid absentee ballots was constitutional be-
cause it enfranchised those who had cast the contested absentee bal-
lots. Instead the federal court emphasized the disenfranchising effect 
of the Alabama court’s order: 
[T]he change in the rules after the election would have the effect of 
disenfranchising those who would have voted but for the inconven-
ience imposed by the notarization/witness requirement. . . . We be-
lieve that, had the candidates and citizens of Alabama known that 
something less than the signature of two witnesses or a notary at-
testing to the signature of absentee voters would suffice, campaign 
strategies would have taken this into account and supporters [of 
the candidates disadvantaged by the rule change] who did not vote 
would have voted absentee.182 
 Unlike the Rhode Island court’s order in Griffin and the Alabama 
court’s order in Roe, the Florida court’s order in Gore v. Harris was 
enfranchising. It would have provided for the review of tens of thou-
sands of uncounted undervote ballots and potentially would have led 
to the counting of whatever valid votes were found among those bal-
lots. The Gore order would not have unfairly burdened other voters 
or potential voters. Both the availability of the manual recount and 
the use of the “intent of the voter” standard were consistent with 
preexisting law. Even if the Florida order could somehow be charac-
terized as a change in the law, it is hard to see how such a change 
disenfranchised anyone. Unlike the situation in Roe, it is simply im-
possible to believe that some Floridians assumed they would be un-
able to fully detach their chad and did not bother to vote but that 
they would have voted if they had known that a manual count, using 
a liberal standard, would have been required for all undervotes, and 
thus they were disenfranchised by the Florida order.  
 The Florida case is much closer to Partido Nuevo Progresista v. 
Barreto Perez183 than it is to Roe. In Partido Nuevo Progresista, the 
First Circuit reversed the district court and rejected federal interven-
tion in a Puerto Rico election dispute where the election administra-
tor counted as votes ballots with marks above the list of a party’s 
candidates rather than in the places on the ballot designated for in-
dicating preferences. The court emphasized that the administrator’s 
order was enfranchising and that “no party or person is likely to have 
                                                                                                                    
 181. Id. at 581.  
 182. Id. at 581-82. 
 183. 639 F.2d 825 (1st Cir. 1980). 
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acted to their detriment by relying upon the invalidity of ballots with 
marks outside the ballots’ drawn rectangles.”184 
 The Florida court’s order did not intentionally discriminate among 
voters. As already noted, the Florida court did not itself require the 
use of a more inclusionary standard for determining legal votes in 
some counties and a less inclusionary one in others. Any differences 
in counting standards would have been the result of local action, not 
state mandate. If anything, the Florida court’s order would have 
ameliorated the intercounty differences in effective voting rates at-
tributable to the differences in the quality of voting machinery. Vot-
ers in counties using punch card ballots had an appreciably lower 
chance of casting effective votes than voters in counties using optical 
scan machinery.185 The recount order would have reduced the dispar-
ity in effective voting rates between punch card and optical scan 
counties, although, to be sure, it could have led to the creation of 
smaller disparities within the punch card counties if the counties in 
fact used different counting standards.  
 Even then, by directing that the recount be undertaken under the 
auspices of a circuit court judge who had the authority to hear chal-
lenges to counting team decisions and resolve disputed cases, the 
Florida court’s order provided an opportunity for reducing inter-
county differences. Oddly, the Bush v. Gore per curiam cabined the 
application of equal protection in the election administration context 
to “the special instance of a statewide recount under the authority of 
a single state judicial officer.”186 Yet, by placing the recount under the 
authority of a single state judicial officer, the Florida Supreme Court 
actually created the possibility of reconciling intercounty differences 
and harmonizing standards. Certainly, the order created a greater 
possibility for statewide consistency in ballot evaluating standards 
than was the case with the protest phase recounts, when no state of-
ficer reconciled intercounty variations in counting standards. 
 Even if intercounty variations in the determination of whether a 
ballot contained a valid vote had resulted, and even if those varia-
tions could be attributed to the state supreme court’s failure to spell 
out ballot assessment standards, the Florida court’s action did not 
threaten the integrity of the election under the circumstances of the 
Florida presidential recount dispute. Rather, the Florida court’s fail-
                                                                                                                    
 184. Id. at 828; see also Roe v. Alabama, 43 F.3d at 581-82 (citing Partido Nuevo Pro-
gresista with approval). 
 185. 36 DAYS, supra note 13, at 191. In the counties that used optical scan ballots, just 
0.30 percent of ballots had no selection for President whereas in the counties that used 
Votomatic punch card ballots, 1.53 percent of the votes had no selection for President. In-
deed, in every single one of those counties, the undervote fraction was greater than one 
percent, and in five counties (including Palm Beach county) the undervote fraction was 
greater than two percent. Id. 
 186. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 109 (2000). 
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ure to spell out more precise rules for the evaluation of undervote 
ballots may have been required by the constitutional and statutory 
rules governing presidential elections. 
 Just four days before Gore v. Harris was decided, the United 
States Supreme Court had sharply reminded the Florida court of the 
Florida Legislature’s exclusive constitutional prerogative to deter-
mine the rules for selecting presidential electors. The Supreme Court 
had also hinted broadly that the Florida Legislature would probably 
have wanted to secure the safe harbor provided by 3 U.S.C. § 5 by 
avoiding the creation of any rules for the presidential election that 
could be characterized as postelection day new law. The Florida Leg-
islature had never adopted a standard for evaluating ballots more 
specific than “the intent of the voter.” Similarly, Florida case law 
concerning the determination of legal votes prior to November 2000 
had been phrased exclusively in terms of the “intent of the voter.” 
Given Bush v. Palm Beach County Canvassing Board, if the Florida 
Supreme Court had adopted a more specific standard, such action 
could have been challenged as a violation of Article II, Section 1 and 
a threat to the federal statutory safe harbor. In effect, Bush v. Palm 
Beach County Canvassing Board chastised the Florida Supreme 
Court for doing what Bush v. Gore subsequently condemned the Flor-
ida court for not doing—making new law with respect to the resolu-
tion of a dispute in the selection of presidential electors.  
 Under these circumstances, the Florida court’s order did not 
threaten the integrity of the presidential election. After Bush v. Palm 
Beach County Canvassing Board, judicial deference to the legislature 
and avoidance of making new law for the resolution of election dis-
putes are part of the very definition of electoral fairness and integrity 
in the presidential election setting. If it had spelled out a standard 
more specific than the “intent of the voter” for the evaluation of un-
dervote ballots, the Florida Supreme Court would surely have been 
creating new law. The Florida court’s order may have permitted in-
tercounty and intracounty inconsistencies in the evaluation of un-
dervote ballots. But the court’s failure to adopt a standard that would 
have precluded those inconsistencies was apparently required by the 
federal policy of avoiding the state judicial creation of new law in the 
context of a presidential election. 
 In effect, the Florida Supreme Court had two choices. It could 
have declined to order a recount, thus excluding whatever valid votes 
might have been found in the undervote ballots and leaving unreme-
died the effects of the different election machinery in creating differ-
ent undervote rates in different Florida counties. Or it could have 
done what it did—order a statewide recount of the undervote, recog-
nizing that the lack of a precise statewide standard for evaluating 
undervote ballots might lead to certain ballots being counted in some 
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counties while comparable ballots were ignored in other counties. 
The third option implicated by Bush v. Gore—the inclusion of a ballot 
assessment standard in the recount order—was effectively precluded 
by Bush v. Palm Beach County Canvassing Board.187  
 Both of the options available to the Florida court were flawed. 
Each would have entailed some disparities in the treatment of some 
Florida voters. But the second option—the manual recount—at least 
had the benefits of increasing the number of Floridians whose votes 
were counted and of reducing the disparities in voting rates attribut-
able to differences in the quality of county voting machinery. More-
over, whatever disparity of treatment might have occurred due to the 
uncorrected differences in vote assessment standards, it would have 
been the result not of an intent to discriminate among counties or 
among partisan interests but of a constitutional constraint on the 
Florida court’s authority to take the action necessary to avoid that 
disparity.  
 Each option posed issues of fairness but, given the circumstances, 
neither option would have caused a fundamental unfairness or 
threatened the integrity of the election. Certainly it is hard to see 
how the option the Florida court did choose—the manual recount 
without specific standards—was more unfair than no recount, and 
therefore the failure to review tens of thousands of undervote ballots 
at all. The Florida court’s recount order may have been debatable as 
a matter of Florida election law—an issue beyond the scope of this 
Article—but it did not create the kind of fundamental unfairness 
that ought to be necessary to support a finding that it violated the 
Equal Protection Clause. Indeed, in seeking to expand the number of 
voters counted while reducing the differences in effective voting 
rights among counties, the Florida court’s order was far more consis-
tent with the United States Supreme Court’s use of the Equal Protec-
tion Clause in its modern voting rights cases than was the Supreme 
Court majority in Bush v. Gore. 
V.   CONCLUSION: FEDERALISM AND EQUAL PROTECTION 
IN BUSH V. GORE 
 Many observers were struck by the obvious fact that the five Jus-
tices who led the Court’s unprecedented intervention into a state’s 
vote counting process, and who injected federal equal protection con-
cerns into an area hitherto seen as a matter largely committed to the 
                                                                                                                    
 187. A fourth option, of course, was to grant Gore’s request and order a manual recount 
limited to the uncounted Miami-Dade undervote ballots. For the reason given in the text—
that Miami-Dade was selected for the protest phase recount because of its Democratic ma-
jority and thus a recount limited to Miami-Dade would have been unfairly pro-
Democratic—this option would have created a fundamental unfairness. 
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states,188 were also the five Justices who have mounted the Court’s 
recent aggressive defense of states rights against federal power. 
These are the Justices who read the “anti-commandeering” doctrine 
into the Tenth Amendment,189 reinvigorated the Eleventh Amend-
ment,190 and imposed new limits on Congress’s power to act under the 
Commerce Clause191 and under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment.192 
 The tension between Bush v. Gore and federalism is not simply a 
matter of the Court’s application of equal protection principles to 
state election administration. Federalism has always included fed-
eral judicial protection of federal constitutional rights. As I have sug-
gested earlier, equal protection principles have been applied to voting 
in state and local elections, and it is no great stretch of the Constitu-
tion’s vindication of the right to vote and the right to an equally 
weighted vote to subject state voting mechanisms that operate to dis-
enfranchise voters or to discriminate among voters to equal protec-
tion principles. The evidence from Florida concerning the disparate 
voter error rates resulting from different types of voting machines 
and different ballot designs suggests that equal protection could play 
a legitimate and useful role in curbing the structural inequalities in 
voting that currently plague our system.  
 The real tension between Bush v. Gore and federalism is that the 
gravamen of the particular equal protection violation at the heart of 
Bush v. Gore is the value at the heart of federalism itself—
decentralized decisionmaking and the resulting variations in gov-
ernment action. Bush v. Gore’s greatest concern was with the poten-
                                                                                                                    
 188. The lower federal courts have repeatedly refused to get involved in disputes in-
volving “garden variety” irregularities of state and local election administration, even 
when such irregularities have resulted in the rejection of some valid votes or undermined 
the validity of an election. See, e.g., Gold v. Feinberg, 101 F.3d 796, 801 (2d Cir. 1996); 
Curry v. Baker, 802 F.2d 1302, 1316 (11th Cir. 1986); Bodine v. Elkhart County Election 
Bd., 788 F.2d 1270 (7th Cir. 1986); Partido Nuevo Progresista, 639 F.2d 825; Gamza v. 
Aguirre, 619 F.2d 449, 454 (5th Cir. 1980). Rare exceptions are Roe v. Alabama, 43 F.3d 
574 (11th Cir. 1995) (finding that a change in law concerning absentee ballots unfairly 
surprised those who had relied on restrictive law by not voting absentee); Duncan v. 
Poythress, 657 F.2d 691 (5th Cir. Unit B 1981) (failing to hold an election altogether was 
held to be a denial of voting rights); and Griffin v. Burns, 570 F.2d 1065 (1st Cir.1978) 
(holding that a postelection ruling by a state court that absentee ballots should not have 
been allowed and thus that nearly ten percent of the ballots cast should not be counted; 
such a surprise massive disfranchisement after the election was unconstitutional). 
 189. See, e.g., Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997). 
 190. See, e.g., Board of Tr. of Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001); Kimel v. Fla. 
Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000); Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (2000); Coll. Savs. Bank 
v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666 (2000); Fla. Prepaid Post-
secondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Savs. Bank, 527 U.S. 627 (2000); Seminole Tribe of 
Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996). 
 191. See, e.g., United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000); United States v. Lopez, 
514 U.S. 549 (1995). 
 192. See, e.g., Morrison, 529 U.S. 598; City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997). 
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tial for varying local standards when determining whether an under-
vote ballot contained a valid vote. These variations occurred because 
state institutions—the legislature, the Secretary of State as chief 
administrative officer of the elections system, and the state supreme 
court—had not adopted rules guiding the actions of county canvass-
ing boards and their counting teams. Although there is no evidence 
that Florida intentionally chose to devolve this difficult question to 
the county canvassing boards, that would not have been an unrea-
sonable thing to do. Given the absence of one right answer for balanc-
ing the competing factors of voter inclusion, objectivity, and ease of 
administration, the state could have chosen to let the counties decide 
this, with different counties balancing these factors differently. 
Those that valued inclusion could have adopted a more liberal rule, 
while those that believed that the voters should be required to make 
a greater effort to confirm that their chads had detached or those 
more concerned about the objectivity of local election administrators 
could have adopted a more restrictive rule.  
 A longstanding principle of federalism has been that state-local 
relationships and the nature and scope of a state’s delegation of 
power to its local units is, as a matter of federalism, largely for the 
states.193 To be sure, state delegations or, more commonly, state 
modifications of traditionally delegated powers that target particular 
groups or burden fundamental rights, are subject to federal constitu-
tional review.194 But even when decentralization imposes some con-
straints on the ability to vindicate fundamental rights or protect im-
portant interests, the Court has generally treated the state-local re-
lationship as primarily a state matter while expressing support for 
the state’s decision to favor local autonomy over other concerns.195 So 
long as any of the standards open to the local canvassing boards—
hanging chad, pierced chad, or indented chad—is constitutional, 
then, as a matter of federalism, the states should be free to leave the 
matter to the local units. Bush v. Gore does not expressly preclude 
such decentralization. By limiting its opinion to “the special instance 
of a statewide recount under the authority of a single state judicial 
officer,” the Court does not even reach recounts that might be con-
                                                                                                                    
 193. Hunter v. City of Pittsburgh, 207 U.S. 161 (1907). 
 194. See, e.g., Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996); Bd. of Educ. v. Kiryas Joel Vill. 
Sch. Dist., 512 U.S. 687 (1994); Washington v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 458 U.S. 457 (1983); 
Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960). 
 195. See Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974) (holding that the protection of a sys-
tem of decentralized education administration justifies reversal of lower court order requir-
ing inclusion of suburban school districts in a metropolitan area desegregation plan); San 
Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 49-50 (1973) (finding that decentraliza-
tion of education administration justifies the interdistrict inequalities in revenues and ex-
penditures resulting from differences in local wealth and reliance on local wealth in fund-
ing schools).  
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ducted under the auspices of a state administrative body.196 But the 
implication is clearly that the decentralization of the determination 
of counting standards is unconstitutional. 
 Bush v. Gore does not simply challenge the state’s power to decen-
tralize some aspects of election law decisionmaking. It raises ques-
tions about the variations that result from such decentralization. The 
central principle of federalism is diversity. Federalism necessarily 
results in differences—differences that grow from variations in 
needs, circumstances, preferences, and decisionmaking processes. 
These differences reflect the local political participation that federal-
ism promotes and the local innovation that federalism protects. Yet, 
where federalism ordinarily celebrates diversity, local participation, 
and local experimentation, the Bush v. Gore per curiam saw arbi-
trary and disparate treatment in different counties. 
 Certainly federalism produces “disparate” rules for different 
places. But the theory of federalism suggests that such differences, 
although perhaps arbitrary in the sense that there is no justification 
that links a particular local rule to specific local circumstances, are 
also an inevitable outgrowth of decentralized decisionmaking. Differ-
ent groups of people look at the same problem differently and reach 
different conclusions about that problem. As a result, they adopt dif-
ferent responses to the same problems. There may be no objective 
explanation for the different preferences and different results, but 
they exist nonetheless. Federalism means those differences may be 
translated into different legal rules in different places. 
 The tension between the per curiam’s federalism jurisprudence 
and its Bush v. Gore opinion is thus not that the Court has invaded 
an area that has hitherto been a province of the states. Rather, it is 
the Court’s apparent discomfort with the varying local standards 
that are the inevitable accompaniment of decentralized decisionmak-
ing—the very decentralized decisionmaking that is the heart and 
soul of federalism.  
 Decentralization and the resulting variations in local standards 
and practices are not always desirable. Election administration could 
very well benefit from state legislative decisions that provide for vot-
ing machinery that is of uniform quality statewide, that standardize 
ballot design, or that specify consistent statewide procedures for re-
solving questions concerning improperly marked ballots. But where, 
as in Bush v. Gore, the intrastate variations do not exclude otherwise 
valid ballots, involve state-ordered geographic discrimination, upset 
voters’ expectations, or otherwise undermine fundamental fairness, a 
commitment to the spirit of federalism would appear to counsel in fa-
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vor of accepting local decisionmaking rather than undertaking fed-
eral judicial intervention. Certainly, Bush v. Gore was far from com-
pelled by the Court’s voting rights cases. Decentralized decisionmak-
ing has most typically fallen to a constitutional challenge when some 
state or local decisionmakers fail to abide by federally required stan-
dards, or when decentralization is a guise for discrimination against 
locally vulnerable groups. In Bush v. Gore, the intercounty and intra-
county variations were just that—variations. None of them fell below 
federal standards concerning the undervote (since no such standards 
exist). And there was no evidence that the variation in standards 
would have discriminated against geographic interests or partisan 
groups. The variations in counting standards were troublesome to 
the Justices and, ultimately, held unconstitutional, simply because 
they were variations.  
 Bush v. Gore is an unusual equal protection case. The Florida Su-
preme Court’s order did not exclude voters; rather, it would have ex-
panded the ability of Florida voters to cast effective votes. Nor did 
the Florida order discriminate against any class of voters or ratify 
the discriminatory actions of other institutions. But what is perhaps 
more striking is the U.S. Supreme Court majority’s failure even to 
consider the federalism implications of the case. The Court did not 
appear to recognize that it was federalizing a state-local relationship. 
Nor did it even attempt to reconcile its usually strong commitment to 
federalism with its apparent discomfort with decentralization and, 
especially, its hostility to the variation in local standards that inevi-
tably follows from decentralized governance. 
